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 COMMENT 
Sustainable Constitutional Growth?  The 




The Missouri River Basin is comprised of more than 100 million acres 
of cropland across nine states, including Missouri.1  It produces nearly half of 
U.S. wheat, nearly a quarter of its grain corn, and over a third of its cattle, and 
in 2008, the value of these crops and livestock exceeded $100 billion.2  Mis-
souri’s share in this revenue, however, contributed to less than three percent 
of Missouri’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) in 2013:3 not what one would 
call the “foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy,” or even a 
“vital sector of Missouri’s economy.”4  Yet these assertions are memorialized 
 
* B.A., Brigham Young University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2016; Senior Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I 
am very grateful to Professor Erin Morrow Hawley for her kind guidance in preparing 
this Comment; Stephen Davis for his helpful suggestions; the Missouri Law Review 
team for making this a better piece than it was to start with; and, above all, my ever-
supportive husband for his encouragement and our two children for their love. 
 1. The basin is comprised of Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming.  Decadal Climate and Impacts 
Prediction in the Missouri River Basin (MRB), MONTANA 1, http://drought.mt.gov/
Links/Documents/forcasting_decadal_climate_variability.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 
2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Mo. Econ. Research & Info. Ctr., Gross Domestic Product Data Series, 2013 
Estimates, MO. DEP’T ECON. DEV., http://www.missourieconomy.org/indicators/
gsp/index.stm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).  A figure of 1.7% included not only agricul-
ture and forestry, but also hunting and fishing.  Id.; see also MO. ECON. RESEARCH & 
INFO. CTR., MO. DEP’T ECON. DEV., MISSOURI ECONOMIC REPORT 4 (2014), 
http://www.missourieconomy.org/pdfs/2014_mo_economic_report.pdf  (putting 
“Natural Resources (including Agriculture) and Mining” at 2.3% of Missouri’s gross 
domestic product.).  This figure was 7% in 2008.  See Mo. Econ. Research & Info. 
Ctr., Missouri Economic Impact Brief, Agricultural Industries, MO. DEP’T ECON. 
DEV. (Oct. 2008), https://www.missourieconomy.org/pdfs/missouri_ag_impact.pdf. 
 4. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
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in the newly passed “right-to-farm” state constitutional amendment submitted 
to, and endorsed by, Missouri’s popular vote in August 2014:5 
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and se-
curity is the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  
To protect this vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers 
and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices shall be for-
ever guaranteed in this state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any, 
conferred by article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.6 
Historically, these assertions were certainly true of Missouri’s econo-
my.7  Even now, when they are rote platitudes more than assertions of present 
fact, Missouri does have an interest in protecting agriculture, both as a histor-
ically important sector and as a livelihood that supports many individual Mis-
souri citizens.  Missouri remains an important agricultural state, even as agri-
culture is dwarfed by industry.8  However, the placement of this amendment 
in Missouri’s constitutional bill of rights, and its expansive constitutional 
language, warrants some concern as to its actual effect.  This is not really a 
question of economics.  Even if agriculture in Missouri produced twenty 
times the revenue it does now, the amendment still might privilege certain 
rights in Missouri at the expense of others – regardless of whether the majori-
ty of voting Missourians approved. 
Indeed, while the amendment did receive a majority vote from Missouri 
citizens, it was perhaps the barest majority possible at 50.12%.9  The contro-
versial enactment of the right-to-farm amendment serves as a prime example 
through which to examine judicial review of state constitutional amendments 
both during and after the political process.  The available legal challenges are 
divisible into two general categories: (1) challenges to the political constitu-
tional amendment process and (2) substantive challenges to constitutional 
amendments themselves.  This Comment will discuss these challenges as 
applied to the right-to-farm amendment.10 
 
 5. Gov. Nixon Sets Election Dates for 2014 Ballot Measures, OFF. MO. 
GOVERNOR JAY NIXON (May 23, 2014), https://governor.mo.gov/news/archive/gov-
nixon-sets-election-dates-2014-ballot-measures. 
 6. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
 7. Missouri, like many of the “Great Plains” states, was settled by farmers.  
ROBYN BURNETT & KEN LUEBBERING, IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE SETTLEMENT OF 
MISSOURI 95 (2005). 
 8. E-mail from Erin Morrow Hawley, Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. 
Sch. of Law, to author (Apr. 10, 2015, 7:25 PM) (on file with author). 
 9. State of Missouri – Primary Election – August 5, 2014, Official Results, MO. 
SECRETARY ST., http://enrarchives.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/default.aspx (click on the 
“Choose election type” dropdown box, then select “Primary Election – August 5, 
2014” and click “Submit”) (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
 10. See infra Part II.D. 
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Part I discusses the historical background and enactment of the amend-
ment.  Next, Part II outlines the legal challenges available during the political 
constitutional amendment process, detailing what challenges were – or were 
not – made to the right-to-farm amendment during its enactment.  Part III 
discusses how Missouri courts generally review legislatively-referred consti-
tutional amendments and how they would likely review challenges brought 
under the right-to-farm amendment.  Part IV discusses the adequacy of exist-
ing legal challenges to Missouri constitutional amendments – particularly on 
the front end – when these amendments are enacted via a single election.  It 
also provides suggestions for the needed reform of this process.  Even if the 
right-to-farm amendment just reaffirms rights already available to Missouri 
citizens, it was an expensive experiment on the state’s bill of rights.  Ulti-
mately, however, it seems to do more than that by foreclosing future legisla-
tive regulation of agriculture and possibly overturning existing statutory 
measures.  While this Comment is not an indictment of farmers’ rights, it 
questions whether the existing constitutional amendment process, exempli-
fied in the passage of the right-to-farm amendment, adequately corresponds 
to the foundational nature of the Missouri Constitution. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Conflicts between agriculture and urbanization in Missouri are nearly as 
old as the state itself.  Following the Civil War, industrialization not only 
revolutionized urban centers, but it also changed the landscape of farming 
communities in Missouri.11  New technologies like barbed wire, threshers, 
and baling machines dramatically decreased the labor and time required for 
producing crops.12  This led to crop specialization and the formation of “bo-
nanza farms,” and many small farmers were pushed off of their lands, unable 
to compete.13  But farmers soon began to face additional competition beyond 
their fellow farmers.  Throughout the mid- to late-nineteenth century, a num-
ber of farmers brought nuisance actions against businesses and cities, as the 
latter’s expansion damaged the farmers’ crops.14 
 
 11. Angela Bell, Lesson 2: The Urban North and the Rural West, HIST. 1200: 
SURVEY OF AM. HIST. SINCE 1865, http://online.missouri.edu/exec/data/courses/2626/
public/lesson02/lesson02.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 53 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1899) (farmer brought nuisance 
claim against city, alleging that its sewer system contaminated the stream that he used 
for his livestock and other farming purposes); Brown v. Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 80 
Mo. 457, 458 (1883); Dickson v. Chi., Rock Island & P. R.R. Co., 71 Mo. 575, 576 
(1880) (farmer brought action for nuisance against railroad for building a dam that 
flooded farmer’s property); Van Hoozier v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 70 Mo. 
145, 146 (1879) (farmer brought action for nuisance against railroad for building a 
dam that flooded farmer’s property); Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875) (farmer 
brought action for nuisance against mill owner whose dam water-logged part of the 
3
Kennedy: Sustainable Constitutional Growth?
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
208 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Over the next century, agriculture, cities, and business in Missouri con-
tinued to grow side-by-side at various paces.  By 2012, the value of farms in 
Missouri was at record highs – up twenty-two percent since 2007.15  That 
being said, the future of Missouri farms was, and still is, somewhat uncertain, 
as farmland continues to be lost to expanding “residential, commercial and 
industrial land uses.”16  The number of farms in Missouri is decreasing,17 and 
the amount of farmland in the state decreased by nearly one million acres 
between 2007 and 2012.18  More worrisome still, as of 2012, seventy-one 
percent of Missouri farmers were over age fifty-five.19  Only 12.6% of Mis-
souri farmers were under age forty-four.20 
 
farmer’s property); Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517, 518 (1848) (small farm 
brought action for nuisance against a large distillery and hog-farm operation for con-
taminating water); Powers v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 71 Mo. App. 540 
(1897) (farmer brought claim for nuisance against railroad for building too small of a 
canal and causing his property to flood); Thomas v. Concordia Cannery Co., 68 Mo. 
App. 350 (1897) (farmer brought nuisance against canning factory for spilling refuse 
onto his property, contaminating the water that ran through his property, and making 
his property unfit for farming and pasturing); Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. App. 59, 
60 (1894) (farmer brought nuisance action against brick kiln, alleging that its smoke 
and gases had destroyed his crops); Carson v. City of Springfield, 53 Mo. App. 289, 
298 (1893) (farmer brought nuisance action against city for draining water onto and 
flooding his land); McKee v. St. Louis, Keokuk & Nw. R.R. Co., 49 Mo. App. 174, 
179 (1892) (farmer brought action for nuisance against railroad for building a dam 
that flooded farmer’s property). 
 15. Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC., http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_
Chapter_1_State_Level/Missouri/st29_1_001_001.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 16. Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do 
Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 90 n.22 (2006) 
(citing Farming on the Edge: Sprawling Development Threatens America’s Best 
Farmland, AM.  FARMLAND TRUST (2002), http://www.farmland.org/farmingonthe
edge/Farmingon the Edge.pdf) (“From 1992–97, the United States converted more 
than 6 million acres of agricultural land to a more developed use.  It has been estimat-
ed that our country loses two acres of farmland every minute.”). 
 17. Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, supra note 
15.  The number of farms has gone from 107,825 in 2007 to 99,171 in 2012 – a de-
crease of 8654 farms.  Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  According to the 2012 agricultural census, only 0.7% of Missouri farm-
ers are under age 25, 4.7% are between the ages of 25 and 34, 7.2% are between 35 
and 44, 16.4% are between the ages of 45 and 54, approximately 26% are between the 
ages of 55 and 64, and approximately 45% are over age 65.  See Table 69. Summary 
by Age and Primary Occupation of Principal Operator: 2012, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1
_State_Level/Missouri/st29_1_069_069.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 20. Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, supra note 
15. 
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Technological advancements have improved agricultural productivity, 
further reducing farm labor in the state by nearly twenty-nine percent be-
tween 2002 and 2007.21  Indeed, contemporary agriculture operations involve 
“factory” more than “family” farms.22  More animals are concentrated in few-
er operations, and confinement is now the primary method of animal produc-
tion.23  For example, the number of hogs in the state of Missouri stayed 
roughly the same between 1982 and 2007, while the number of Missouri’s 
hog farms during that period dropped by nearly ninety percent.24 
These concentrated animal operations pose increased environmental and 
health risks.   As the U.S. General Accounting Office reported, “Nationwide, 
about 130 times more animal waste is produced than human waste—roughly 
5 tons for every U.S. citizen—and some operations with hundreds of thou-
sands of animals produce as much waste as a town or a city.”25  This waste 
puts pollutants into the environment that are harmful to human health.26  Sim-
ilarly, the widespread application of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers to 
crops can also contribute to health problems, like birth defects, nerve damage, 
 
 21. Mo. Econ. Research & Info. Ctr., Missouri Economic Research Brief, Farm 
and Agribusiness, MO. DEP’T ECON. DEV. (Mar. 2009), https://www.missouri
economy.org/pdfs/missouri_farms_and_agribusiness.pdf. 
 22. James S. Cooper, Slaughterhouse Rules: How Ag-Gag Laws Erode the Con-
stitution, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 233, 233–35 (2013). 
 23. ROBBIN MARKS, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME, HOW 
FACTORY FARM LAGOONS AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH 4 (July 2001), 
https://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/cesspools/cesspools.pdf.  For example, from 
1980 to 2011, the number of hog operations in the United States dropped from 
666,000 to roughly 69,000, yet the number of hogs sold remains almost the same.  Id. 
 24. Compare Table 29. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory: 1982 and 1978, U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC., 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/AgCensusImages/1982/01/25/121/Table-29.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (22,859 farms with 3,186,443 hogs in 1982), with Table 
12. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory and Sales: 2012 and 2007, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_2
_US_State_Level/st99_2_012_012.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (2,999 farms with 
3,101,269 hogs in 2007).  There was an 87% decrease in farms, and only a 3% de-
crease in hogs.  See Table 29. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory: 1982 and 1978, supra; 
Table 12. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory and Sales: 2012 and 200, supra. 
 25. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, WASTE MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 1 (July 1999) (footnote omitted), 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99205.pdf. 
 26. Animal Feeding Operations FAQs, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/animal-
feeding-operations-afos (last updated Jan. 5, 2016) (“Manure and wastewater from 
[animal feeding operations] have the potential to contribute pollutants such as nitro-
gen and phosphorus, organic matter, sediments, pathogens, heavy metals, hormones, 
antibiotics, and ammonia to the environment.”). 
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and cancer.27  Thus, the inevitable industrialization of the farm has changed 
the agricultural landscape dramatically, yet states continue to take a “hands-
off” approach to agriculture regulations.28 
In 2010, it appeared that this approach might be changing.  Missouri 
passed new, restrictive legislation that Missouri Farm Bureau president Blake 
Hurst called a “sort of a wake-up call to agriculture.”29  Colloquially titled 
“Proposition B,” this statute imposed new requirements on dog breeders for 
more humane conditions.30  It subjected offending breeders to fines and pe-
nalized repeat offenders with criminal citations.31  Proposition B had been 
sponsored largely by out-of-state animal rights groups and was interpreted by 
some within the agricultural community as “outsiders” telling farmers how to 
raise their animals.32 
On the heels of this major legislative blow to Missouri agricultural 
groups, a class of plaintiffs won an $11 million odor nuisance suit against a 
northwestern Missouri hog farm.33  In response, agricultural lobbyists and 
proponents marshalled to the cause of protecting the rights of Missouri ranch-
ers and farmers from outsiders several generations removed from the farm.34  
Various Missouri legislators proposed bills to protect farmers’ rights to raise 
animals and perform other farming practices, and it was against this backdrop 
in January 2013 that Bill Reiboldt and Jason Smith in the Missouri House of 
Representatives introduced the bills that would become the right-to-farm 
 
 27. Pesticides and Food: Health Problems Pesticides May Pose, EPA, 
http://facweb.northseattle.edu/twkaufman/NTR%20150/Helpful%20Links/
EPA_Pesticides%20and%20health%20risks.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2013). 
 28. Nadia S. Adawi, State Preemption of Local Control over Intensive Livestock 
Operations, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10506 (2014). 
 29. Jo Mannies, Proposed ‘Right to Farm’ Constitutional Amendment Likely to 
End Up in Court, ST. LOUIS BEACON (June 17, 2013, 6:13 AM), https://www.
stlbeacon.org/#!/content/31349/right_to_farm_061113_. 
 30. See, e.g., Interests Outside of Missouri are Financing Proposition B, MO. 
FARM BUREAU, http://www.mofb.org/NewsMedia/News.aspx?articleID=103 (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 31. 2010 Initiative Petitions Approved for Circulation in Missouri, Statutory 
Amendment to Chapter 273, Relating to Dog Breeders, MO. SECRETARY ST., 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2010petitions/2010-085 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 32. Interests Outside of Missouri are Financing Proposition B, supra note 30. 
 33. Owens v. ContiGroup Cos., 344 S.W.3d 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).  The 
Western District Court of Appeals affirmed March 29, 2011.  Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Ashley Jost, Senate Passes “Right to Farm,” House Unsatisfied, 
MO. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://themissouritimes.com/2353/senate-passes-right-to-
farm-house-unsatisfied/; Cyndi Young, Right to Farm is not Us vs. Them, 
BROWNFIELD AG NEWS FOR AM.  (July 24, 2014), http://brownfieldagnews.com/
2014/07/24/right-to-farm-is-not-us-vs-them/; Tyler Castner, Smart Decision 2014: 
Analyzing Amendment One – The Right to Farm, KOMU, http://www.komu.com/
news/smart-decision-2014-analyzing-amendment-one-the-right-to-farm/ (last updated 
Aug. 4, 2014, 1:42 PM). 
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amendment.35  Their separate efforts were consolidated into a single bill,36 
which was revised37 and reported to the Senate in March 2013.38 
 
 35. Representative Bill Reiboldt introduced Joint House Resolution 11, which 
read: 
 
That agriculture, which provides food, energy, and security, is the foundation 
and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  To protect this vital sector of 
Missouri’s economy, it shall be the right of persons to raise livestock in a hu-
mane manner without the state imposing an undue economic burden on animal 
owners.  No law criminalizing the welfare of any livestock shall be valid un-
less based upon generally accepted scientific principles and enacted by the 
general assembly. 
 
H.R.J. Res. No. 11, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013),  
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/intro/HJR0011I.PDF (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2016).  Representative Jason Smith introduced Joint House Resolution 
7, which read: 
 
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is 
the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  To protect this 
vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to en-
gage in modern farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in 
this state.  No law shall be enacted which abridges the right of farmers and 
ranchers to employ agricultural technology and modern livestock production 
and ranching practices.  That the citizens of this state have a right to hunt, fish, 
and harvest wildlife.  The control, management, restoration, conservation, and 
regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry, and all wildlife resources of the 
state, and the administration of all laws pertaining thereto, is vested in a con-
servation commission, as provided in article IV, section 40, Constitution of 
Missouri.  No law and no rule or regulation shall unreasonably restrict hunt-
ing, fishing, and harvesting wildlife or the use of traditional devices and 
methods.  Laws, rules, and regulations authorized under this section shall have 
the purpose of wildlife conservation and management and preserving the fu-
ture of hunting and fishing.  Public hunting and fishing shall be a preferred 
means of managing and controlling wildlife.  This section shall not be con-
strued to modify any provision of common law or statutes relating to trespass 
or property rights. 
 
H.R.J. Res. No. 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), http://www.house.
mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/intro/HJR0007I.PDF (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 36. A new joint resolution combined 11 and 7: 
 
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is 
the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  To protect this 
vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to en-
gage in modern farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in 
this state.  No law shall be enacted which abridges the right of farmers and 
ranchers to employ agricultural technology and modern livestock production 
and ranching practices. 
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The Missouri Senate, however, resisted language in the House’s bill that 
barred initiative petitions39 to regulate farming practices, and they offered 
their own substitute bill.40  This was again amended41 and voted on in its final 
form in May 2013.42  More than eighty percent of House members supported 
 
H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), 
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/commit/HJR0011C.PDF (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 37. The last sentence was revised as follows: “No state law shall be enacted 
which abridges the right of farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural technology 
and modern and traditional livestock production and ranching practices, unless enact-
ed by the General Assembly.”  Perfected H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013) (emphasis added), http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/
bills131/billpdf/perf/HJR0011P.PDF (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). 
 38. Activity History for HJR 11, MO. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.
house.mo.gov/BillActions.aspx?bill=HJR11&year=2013&code=R (last visited Jan. 
11, 2016). 
 39. Initiative petitions are constitutional amendments or statutes initiated directly 
by a state citizen and then put on the ballot for popular vote.  MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 
49–53; id. at art. XII, §2(b). 
 40. Senate Substitute for House Committee Substitute for House Joint Resolution 
Nos. 11 & 7, http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/hlrbillspdf/0132S.
03F.PDF (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).  The senate substitute ended with: 
 
No state law shall be enacted which abridges the right of farmers and ranchers 
to engage in agricultural production and ranching practices, unless enacted by 
the General Assembly.  Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to abro-
gate the authority of political subdivisions to exercise powers vested therein 
by the laws of the state of Missouri. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 41. Journal of the Senate, Forty-Seventh Day, MO. SENATE (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/13info/Journals/RDay470410724-737.pdf#toolbar=1.  A 
proposed senate amendment was ultimately rejected: “This section shall not apply to 
animals.  ‘Animal’ shall be defined as any dog or cat, which is being used, or is in-
tended for use, for research, teaching, testing, breeding, or exhibition purposes, or as a 
pet.”  Id. 
 42. Activity History for HJR 11, supra note 38.  The final joint house resolution, 
the language of which became effective as Section 35 of Article I of the Missouri 
Constitution, read as follows: 
 
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is 
the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  To protect this 
vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to en-
gage in farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in this 
state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any, conferred by article VI of the 
Constitution of Missouri. 
 
Truly Agreed To and Finally Passed, H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/truly/
HJR0011T.PDF (last visited Jan. 11. 2016). 
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the bill, and the Senate vote, also exceeding an eighty percent majority, car-
ried the proposed constitutional amendment to the 2014 ballot.43 
Proponents and opponents of the amendment then went to work advo-
cating for their respective positions.  Both sides spent millions of dollars 
campaigning on the internet, on television, and through mail and phone 
calls.44  Proponents of the amendment claimed not only that it would protect 
family farms from out-of-state animal rights groups, but they also cam-
paigned for its enactment on the grounds that it would increase revenue and 
food supplies and create jobs.45  Opponents of the amendment worried about 
the amendment’s broad, vague language and claimed instead that it would 
benefit large, foreign-owned corporate farms at the expense of small family 
farms.46 
Governor Jay Nixon put the measure to a public vote on August 5, 
2014,47 where it passed by a margin of less than one percent.48  Wes Shoemy-
er, a former member of the Missouri Senate,49 petitioned for a recount of the 
votes under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.601, which provides that 
any “person whose position on a question was defeated by less than one-half 
of one percent of the votes cast on the question shall be allowed a recount.”50  
On September 15, 2014, the Secretary of State’s office confirmed that the 
amendment had been passed by a majority vote.51  Mr. Shoemyer then filed 
an additional post-election challenge to the amendment with the Supreme 
Court of Missouri under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.557.52 
 
 43. Activity History for HJR 11, supra note 38.  The Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives voted 132 to 25 in favor of the amendment and the Missouri Senate voted 
28 to 6 in favor of the amendment.  Id. 
 44. Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, Shoemyer v. Kander, 464 
S.W.3d 171 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC94516), 2015 WL 718363, at *5–6. 
 45. Elizabeth Crisp, Legislature Sends ‘Right to Farm’ to Missouri Voters, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 14, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/govt-and-politics/legislature-sends-right-to-farm-to-missouri-
voters/article_c9e4baa4-fd66-5fb4-adb6-d21f4375d5c2.html. 
 46. Richard R. Oswald, Missouri Amendment Could Hurt Family Farms, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
opinion/columns/missouri-amendment-could-hurt-family-farms/article_817e34b5-
2913-5a3b-a7f6-b8c31d12e297.html. 
 47. Gov. Nixon Sets Election Dates for 2014 Ballot Measures, supra note 5. 
 48. Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, supra note 44, at *6. 
 49. SENATOR WES SHOEMYER, http://www.senate.mo.gov/10info/members/
mem18.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 50. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.601 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 51. Aja J. Williams, Recount Confirms Mo. Right to Farm Passage, KSDK 
(Sept. 15, 2014, 10:41 PM), 
http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/09/15/missouri-right-to-farm-
amendment-recount-passage/15700643/. 
 52. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, Shoemyer 
v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 171 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC94516), 2014 WL 7669492, 
at *7. 
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II.  CHALLENGES TO MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Since 1875, the Missouri Constitution has given Missourians the power 
to directly adopt constitutional amendments proposed either by citizens (by 
“initiative”) or by the legislature.53  Any such proposal may be enacted if 
approved in a statewide, majority-rule election.54  These proposals and elec-
tions can be subject to judicial review,55 though “[j]udicial intervention is not 
an appropriate substitute for the give and take of the political process.”56  
Chapters 115 and 116 of the Missouri Code govern this process.57  They al-
low for procedural challenges specific to constitutional amendments “by ini-
tiative,” as well as broader procedural challenges for both types of amend-
ments.  This Part will discuss the procedural challenges available under Mis-
souri statutes, the substantive challenges available constitutionally, and the 
application of these challenges to the right-to-farm amendment. 
A.  Procedural Challenges Specific to Constitutional Amendments by 
Initiative 
Petitions to amend the constitution by initiative require signatures of 
eight percent of legal voters in two-thirds of Missouri congressional dis-
tricts.58  These petitions must meet certain requirements as to form, circula-
tion, and submission in order to be valid.59  There are two specific challenges 
that can overcome the successful submission of an initiative petition: signa-
ture withdrawal and a challenge to the sufficiency of the petition.60  The first 
is available only to those who have signed the petition, and the second is 
available to any citizen.61 
Under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 116.110, signers of the petition 
may withdraw their signatures before the petition is submitted by filing a 
 
 53. See MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 49–53; id. at art. XII, §§ 2(a)–(b). 
 54. Id. at art. III, § 52(b); id. at art. XII, § 2(b).  For an excellent description and 
analysis of initiative petitions in general in Missouri, see Nicholas R. Theodore, 
Comment, We the People: A Needed Reform of State Initiative and Referendum Pro-
cedures, 78 MO. L. REV. 1401, 1416 (2013). 
 55. United Gamefowl Breeders Ass’n of Mo. v. Nixon, 19 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Mo. 
2000) (en banc). 
 56. State ex rel. Humane Soc’y of Mo. v. Beetem, 317 S.W.3d 669, 674 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 57. “This chapter shall apply to elections on statewide ballot measures.  The 
election procedures contained in chapter 115 shall apply to elections on statewide 
ballot measures, except to the extent that the provisions of chapter 116 directly con-
flict, in which case chapter 116 shall prevail . . . .”  MO. REV. STAT. § 116.020 (2000). 
 58. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 50. 
 59. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 116.050; MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 116.040, .080, .332 
(West 2016); Mo. Roundtable for Life v. Carnahan, 676 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 60. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.110, .200. 
 61. Id. 
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statement with the Missouri Secretary of State.62  After the petition has been 
submitted, however, withdrawal based on a changed opinion will not render a 
petition ineffective.63  In Rekart v. Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri reasoned that petition signatures merely place proposed amendments 
before voters;64 they do not signify support for the ultimate proposition.65  
Signors who have withdrawn support for the proposed amendment may simp-
ly vote against its adoption at election time.66  After submission to the secre-
tary of state, signatures may only be withdrawn on grounds of fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, duress, or similar allegations.67 
Such grounds, as well as any technical deficiency, would also support a 
challenge to the petition as being otherwise “insufficient.”68  Under Missouri 
Revised Statutes Section 116.200, any citizen may challenge the secretary of 
state’s determination that a petition is sufficient or insufficient.69  This action 
must be filed within ten days of the secretary’s decision.70  If the court de-
cides that the petition is sufficient, the secretary of state must certify it as 
sufficient.71  If the court decides the petition is not sufficient, it will enjoin the 
secretary from certifying the petition and enjoin “all other officers from print-
ing the measure on the ballot.”72  Any party may then appeal the court’s deci-
sion but must do so within ten days.73 
B.  Procedural Challenges Available for Both Kinds of Constitutional 
Amendments 
Citizens may make the following challenges to a proposed amendment 
whether it was submitted by initiative, as described above, or by the legisla-
ture, whose proposed amendments require a simple majority vote by the Gen-
 
 62. Id. § 116.110.  This statement must identify the signor’s name and address 
and the name of the petition signed.  Id. 
 63. Rekart v. Kirkpatrick, 639 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (“An individual’s signature on an initiative petition serves only to secure 
placement of a proposition before the voters; it does not foreclose the signatory’s 
right to vote his conscience for or against the proposition when it appears on a bal-
lot.”) 
 67. See MO. REV. STAT. § 116.090 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (providing for penalties of 
those who falsify signatures); Rekart, 639 S.W.2d at 609. 
 68. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.200 (2000). 
 69. Id.; see also State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 130 S.W. 689 (Mo. 1910) 
(discussing the secretary of state’s authority and role in this manner as purely ministe-
rial, with no discretion). 
 70. § 116.200.3. 
 71. Id. § 116.200.1. 
 72. Id. § 116.200.2. 
 73. Id. § 116.200.3. 
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eral Assembly.74  Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 116 provides for one 
challenge specific to proposed constitutional amendments, and the remaining 
challenges are general challenge provisions applicable to all elections, found 
in Chapter 115.75 
1.  Pre-Election Ballot Title and Fiscal Note Challenges 
Within ten days after the secretary’s certification of a proposed constitu-
tional amendment, any citizen may challenge the amendment’s fiscal note or 
ballot title for insufficiency or unfairness by bringing a Missouri Revised 
Statutes Section 116.190 action in Cole County.76  The fiscal note of an 
amendment estimates the amendment’s “cost or savings, if any, to state or 
local governmental entities.”77  The ballot title of an amendment is what is 
presented to voters on the ballot.78  It is comprised of the summary statement 
and fiscal note summary – either of which is challengeable under Section 
116.190.79 
The summary statement is “a true and impartial statement of the purpos-
es of the proposed measure in language neither intentionally argumentative 
nor likely to create prejudice either for or against the proposed measure.”80  
The summary “should accurately reflect the legal and probable effects of the 
proposed initiative.”81  Similarly, the fiscal note summary “summarizes the 
fiscal note prepared for the measure in language neither argumentative nor 
likely to create prejudice for or against the proposed measure.”82  Neither 
summary may exceed fifty words.83 
The legislature may, but is not required to, prepare the fiscal note, fiscal 
note summary, and summary statement.84  In the event the legislature propos-
es a constitutional amendment without a fiscal note or fiscal note summary, 
the state auditor will prepare these portions.85  If the legislature proposes an 
amendment without a summary statement, the secretary of state will prepare 
that portion.86 
 
 74. MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(a). 
 75. See MO. REV. STAT. Chapters 115 and 116. 
 76. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016). 
 77. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.175 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 78. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.155 (2000). 
 79. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190.3. 
 80. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.155.2 (2000). 
 81. Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Archey v. 
Carnahan, 373 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)). 
 82. § 116.155.3. 
 83. Id. § 116.155.2–3. 
 84. Id. § 116.160, .170. 
 85. Id. § 116.170; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 116.175 (Cum. Supp. 2013) 
(providing for judicial review or review by the attorney general). 
 86. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.160 (2000) (subject to review by the attorney general).  
For a discussion of this process, see Theodore, supra note 54. 
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A challenge brought under Section 116.190 must state why the amend-
ment’s fiscal note or ballot title summaries are insufficient or unfair.87  Mis-
souri courts have defined these terms in recent opinions: “[T]he words insuf-
ficient and unfair . . . mean to inadequately and with bias, prejudice, decep-
tion and/or favoritism state the [consequences of the initiative].”88  Ultimate-
ly, the test is whether voters will be “deceived or misled”89 or, similarly, 
whether language on the ballot “likely creates prejudice for or against the 
measure.”90 
The Section 116.190 challenge must also request a different fiscal note 
or ballot title summary.91  The court is empowered to certify the existing lan-
guage to the secretary, change and then certify the language to the secretary, 
or remand a challenged fiscal note and summary to the auditor for preparation 
of a new fiscal note and summary.92  Either party may appeal the court’s de-
cision to the Supreme Court of Missouri within ten days.93  If the court orders 
a change to the ballot title language, the state bears the costs of reprinting.94 
Courts serve the “limited function” in ballot title challenge cases of only 
evaluating and correcting the ballot language.95  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri has emphasized how little this statute allows the court to do: 
while it “authorizes an action to challenge the ballot title . . . it does not au-
thorize an injunction to stop the election.  If the ballot title challenge is timely 
filed, the court is authorized to do no more than certify a correct ballot ti-
tle.”96  In these cases, “the [c]ourts are editors, not executioners.”97 
 
 87. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016). 
 88. Missourians Against Human Cloning v. Carnahan, 190 S.W.3d 451, 456 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Hancock v. Sec’y of State, 885 
S.W.2d 42, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).  Note, however, that although this quote de-
scribes insufficient and unfair “the proper consideration is whether the ballot title is 
‘insufficient or unfair.’”  Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881, 888 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Mo. Mun. League v. Carnahan, 364 S.W.3d 548, 
552 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
 89. Union Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). 
 90. Prentzler v. Carnahan, 366 S.W.3d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State 
ex rel. Humane Soc’y of Mo. v. Beetem, 317 S.W.3d 669, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 91. § 116.190.3. 
 92. Id. § 116.190.4.  This statute was recently challenged as unconstitutional on 
the grounds that the statute gives the courts legislative power.  Dotson v. Kander, 435 
S.W.3d 643 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).  In Dotson, the appellants contended that the stat-
ute violates the separation of powers doctrine by authorizing the judiciary to redraft 
legislation as a remedy.  Opening Brief of Appellants Dotson and Morgan, Dotson, 
435 S.W.3d 643 (No. SC94293), 2014 WL 3597956, at *38. 
 93. § 116.190.4. 
 94. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.195 (2000). 
 95. Prentzler, 366 S.W.3d at 557 (quoting Beetem, 317 S.W.3d at 674). 
 96. Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 829 
(Mo. 1990) (en banc); see Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, supra note 
44, at *11–12. 
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And this is if the courts even reach the challenge on the merits.  Ballot 
title and fiscal note challenges have strict statutory limitations.98  In Knight v. 
Carnahan, for example, Missouri citizens challenged the fiscal note and fis-
cal note summary of a ballot title, arguing that it did not fully account for and 
inform voters of revenue the state would lose under a proposed measure 
brought by initiative.99  The secretary of state had certified the ballot title in 
February 2008 and then certified the sufficiency of the initiative petition in 
August 2008.100  The citizens filed their challenge within ten days of the Au-
gust initiative petition’s certification, but the trial court dismissed the action 
as untimely.101  The citizens appealed, alleging that their challenge was 
brought as to the sufficiency of the petition under Section 116.200.102 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held that be-
cause the citizens were challenging the sufficiency and fairness of the fiscal 
note and summary, their action was subject to the statutory limitation of ten 
days after the official ballot title was certified, rather than ten days after the 
general sufficiency of the petition was certified.103  The court reasoned: 
In section 116.190, the legislature provided a specific means and a 
specific remedy for challenges to the fiscal note summary—as well as 
a specific deadline.  It is axiomatic that where two statutes address the 
same subject matter and there is a necessary repugnance, the specific 
controls over the general.104   
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action, holding 
that the requirements of the specific statutory challenge controlled over the 
requirements of the more general challenge.105 
 
 97. Thomas Rutherford, The People Drunk or the People Sober? Direct Democ-
racy Meets the Supreme Court of Florida, 15 ST.  THOMAS L. REV. 61, 171 (2002). 
 98. See, e.g., § 116.190. 
 99. 282 S.W.3d 9, 18–19 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 100. Id. at 20. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 
[U]nder the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali, section 
116.190.1’s specific deadline would control.  Correspondingly, we must pre-
sume that the legislature acts with purpose and does not insert idle verbiage 
into a statute.  Here the legislature provided a deadline in 116.190.1 for pre-
election challenges to the fiscal note summary; we do not read its language as 
superfluous.  Consequently, Appellants’ challenge to the fiscal note summary 
was time-barred . . . . 
 
Id. at 20–21 (citing Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of St. Louis v. Members of Bd. of 
Aldermen of City of St. Louis, 92 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)). 
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The legislature made a similar rule of construction explicit regarding 
Chapter 115 challenges, which apply to general elections.106  Chapter 116 
provides that “[t]he election procedures contained in chapter 115 shall apply 
to elections on statewide ballot measures, except to the extent that the provi-
sions of chapter 116 directly conflict, in which case chapter 116 shall prevail . 
. . .”107  Thus, if Chapter 115 and Chapter 116 challenges conflict, the Chapter 
116 provision will control. 
2.  Post-Election Irregularity Challenges 
Unlike pre-election challenges, courts will not strike an already-enacted 
amendment down “upon a mere technicality.”108  As mentioned above, Chap-
ter 115 deals with general election procedure, and it currently provides two 
post-election remedies: a recount and a new election.109  Unless it is a very 
close election, these challenges must allege some level of irregularity in the 
election process. 
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.583 authorizes courts to order a 
recount upon “a prima facie showing of irregularities which place the result 
of any contested election in doubt.”110  This challenge may be brought by one 
or more voters registered where the contested election was held,111 by any 
candidate for election to any office,112 or by the election authority.113 
 
 106. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.001 (2000) (the chapter is known as the “Comprehen-
sive Election Act of 1977”). 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.020 (2000); Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response 
Brief, supra note 44, at *10. 
 108. Barnes v. Bailey, 706 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).  See also 16 AM. 
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 41 (“Although the procedure outlined in a state’s consti-
tution for the adoption of a constitutional amendment is mandatory and must be fol-
lowed, the courts are reluctant to declare a constitutional amendment which has been 
adopted by the people invalid on technical grounds.  Thus, if a proposed constitution-
al amendment is published, submitted to a vote of the people, and adopted without 
any question having been raised prior to the election as to the method by which the 
amendment gets before them, a favorable vote by the people will cure defects in the 
form of the submission.  The test for determining whether technical defects will inval-
idate an otherwise valid amendment is whether the cumulative effect of the technical 
defects is harmless or fatal to the ballot or amendment.”). 
 109. Landwersiek v. Dunivan, 147 S.W.3d 141, 149–50 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Bd. 
of Election Comm’rs of St. Louis Cty. v. Knipp, 784 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Mo. 1990) (en 
banc) (“The election law provides two remedies in an election contest when irregular-
ities are shown: Section 115.583, RSMo 1986, permits the circuit court to order a 
recount; Section 115.593, RSMo 1986, authorizes the circuit court to order a new 
election.”). 
 110. § 115.583. 
 111. Id. § 115.553.2. 
 112. Id. § 115.553.1. 
 113. Id. § 115.600.  The election authority is only permitted to seek recount, not a 
new election.  Knipp, 784 S.W.2d at 798. 
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Alternatively, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.601 allows a per-
son who supported a measure that was defeated in an election to request a 
recount of all of the votes on that measure.114  This challenge may only be 
brought when the margin of defeat was less than one percent, allowing for 
one additional count of the votes.115 
The second, more drastic challenge for statewide constitutional amend-
ment elections under Chapter 115 allows a voter to contest the result of any 
election on any question by alleging “irregularities.”116  This election contest 
must be filed directly in the Supreme Court of Missouri within thirty days of 
the official announcement of the election’s result.117  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri is empowered under Section 115.593 to order a new election.118  It 
will do so if there are “irregularities of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on 
the validity of the initial election.”119 
But the term “irregularity” in this statute is not defined, nor have courts 
definitively interpreted it.120  Existing Missouri precedent has only ever found 
the “violation of an election statute”121 to be an irregularity for purposes of an 
election contest, reasoning that “following the legislature’s dictates would be 
regular and deviation irregular.”122  Thus, while the term “irregularities” re-
fers to procedural problems, and not the substantive language of a proposed 
measure,123 these irregularities must be “more than petty procedural infirmi-
 
 114. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.601 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 115. Id. 
 116. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.553 (2000). 
 117. “[A]ll contests to the results of elections on constitutional amendments, on 
state statutes submitted or referred to the voters, and on questions relating to the re-
tention of appellate and circuit judges subject to article V, section 25 of the state con-
stitution shall be heard and determined by the supreme court.”  Id. § 115.555; see also 
id. § 115.557.  This is as opposed to primary election contests, which are brought in 
circuit court under other sections.  Id. § 115.529; MO. REV. STAT. §115.531 (Cum. 
Supp. 2013). 
 118. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.593 (2000).  As are all Missouri courts.  Id. 
 119. Id.; see also id. § 115.553. 
 120. Gerrard v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 913 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 121. Id.; see also Marre v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d 951 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); Eversole 
v. Wood, 754 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Gasconade R–III Sch. Dist. v. Wil-
liams, 641 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Clark v. Trenton, 591 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
 122. Gerrard, 913 S.W.2d at 90; see also Brief of the State, Dotson v. Kander, 
464 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC94492), 2014 WL 7642036, at *15 
(“The term ‘irregularity’ - which is never used in chapter 116 but used several times 
in chapter 115 - always refers to problems in the process, and not in the substantive 
provisions under consideration (or the ballot title for that matter).”). 
 123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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ties.”124  Furthermore, the court must be “firmly convinced” that these irregu-
larities actually affected the outcome of the election.125 
Indeed, a new election is a drastic remedy and is “to be used sparing-
ly.”126  Unlike the recount, which affects the “result” of an election – that is, 
the official announcement of the outcome127 – a new election “tosses aside 
the aggregate of the citizens’ votes, both those properly and improperly cast, 
and for that reason, a new election remedy is appropriate where the validity of 
the entire election is under suspicion, not simply the result of the election.”128 
At present, while election contests have been successfully brought for 
local elections,129 the Supreme Court of Missouri has never ordered a new 
election for state-wide election contests, such as for a constitutional amend-
ment or statute referred to voters.130 
 
 124. Barks v. Turnbeau, 573 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (“[Absentee 
voting irregularities were] more than petty procedural infirmities but abuses of the 
election law which cannot be ignored. . . .  In this case there are just too many in-
stances of actions dissonant with the directives of the ‘Comprehensive Election Act’ 
to be disregarded or considered immaterial to the fundamental purposes of the Act.”). 
 125. Gerrard, 913 S.W.2d at 90 (citing Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. Knipp, 784 
S.W.2d 797, 798 (Mo. 1990) (en banc)). 
 126. Id.  See also Landwersiek v. Dunivan, 147 S.W.3d 141, 149–50 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2004); Mickels v. Henderson, 642 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[E]lection irregularities seldom result in a new election as there are other provisions 
available to punish and deter those who intentionally and purposefully tamper with 
the election process.”); Turnbeau, 573 S.W.2d at 681 (“[T]he decision to overturn an 
election and thereby disenfranchise the voters should not be taken lightly.”). 
 127. Landwersiek, 147 S.W.3d at 149–50 (“The term ‘result’ as used in section 
115.583 refers to the official announcement of the winning candidate and not the 
conduct of the election.”). 
 128. Knipp, 784 S.W.2d at 799 (citing Nichols v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. No.  1 of 
Laclede Cty., 364 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Mo. 1963) (en banc) (distinguishing between validity 
of election as a whole and the legality of individual ballots or category of votes).  But 
see Marre v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (“The latter section [of 
115.583] declares that ‘[w]here the issue is drawn over the validity of certain votes 
cast, a prima facie case is made if the validity of a number of votes equal to or greater 
than the margin of defeat is placed in doubt.’  Without question the legislature in-
tended that when the validity of a number of votes equal to or greater than the margin 
of defeat is placed in doubt, then the election result is cast in doubt and a prima facie 
case is made justifying a recount under § 115.583.  By the same token such finding 
constitutes ‘irregularities of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on the validity of the 
initial election’ justifying a new election under § 115.593.  Both statutes require that a 
showing of irregularities place the result of the election in doubt.  These statutes, in 
pari materia, are clearly in harmony and readily bespeak the showing necessary to 
justify the remedy authorized therein.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Landwersiek, 147 S.W.3d at 149–50. 
 130. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.555 (2000). 
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3.  New Interpretations of these Rules: Dotson v. Kander 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinion in Dotson v. Kander 
suggested that these strict statutory provisions might be open to a more liberal 
construction.131  Samuel Dotson, a Missouri citizen, brought a ballot title 
challenge to a legislatively-referred constitutional amendment that was put on 
the same August 2014 ballot as the right-to-farm amendment.132  He brought 
this challenge in mid-June, approximately six weeks before the election.133  
The trial court dismissed the challenge as moot because under Missouri Re-
vised Statutes Section 115.125.2, “[n]o court shall have the authority to order 
an individual or issue be placed on the ballot less than six weeks before the 
date of the election.”134  In that case, the trial court entered its judgment a 
week into the six-week period.135 
On appeal, while the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed that it was not 
empowered to make any changes to the ballot title, rendering the claim moot, 
it opened the door to possible post-election ballot title challenges.136  It dis-
missed Dotson’s concern that the trial court’s interpretation would totally 
foreclose judicial review of ballot titles, reasoning: 
This concern does not justify abandoning a settled construction of this 
provision, particularly in light of the fact that judicial review of a 
claim that a given ballot title was unfair or insufficient (when not pre-
 
 131. 435 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 132. Id. at 644. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 115.125.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013)). 
 
The legislature’s decision to establish a ‘bright line’ rule prohibiting court-
ordered changes to the ballot within six weeks of an election was not arbitrary.  
It coincides with the printing and availability of absentee ballots, which is to 
begin six weeks prior to an election.  In addition, overseas military ballots are 
to be printed and made available 45 days before an election. 
 
If ballot titles are modified after the six-week pre-election time frame, local 
election authorities would have to reprint ballots.  Also, absentee and overseas 
military voters would be voting on a different ballot title than in-person voters.  
Further, a candidate is not permitted to withdraw after six weeks before the 
election, nor will a disqualified candidate’s name be removed from a ballot 
outside the same time frame. 
 
Id. at 645 (citations omitted). 
 135. Id. at 644 (“[T]his six-week period prior to the August 5 election ended on 
June 24, a date that already had passed when the trial court entered its judgment on 
July 1.”). 
 136. Id. 
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 20
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/20
2016] SUSTAINABLE CONSTITUTIONAL GROWTH? 223 
viously litigated and finally determined) is available in the context of 
an election contest should the proposal be adopted.137  
Indeed, Dotson subsequently brought a post-election challenge to the 
ballot title of the constitutional amendment, which was approved by voters in 
August 2014.138  A similar challenge has been brought against the right-to-
farm amendment, which will be discussed in Part II.D. 
In Dotson’s post-election ballot title challenge, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri explicitly confirmed what it had only intimated before: that ballot 
titles may be challenged post-election.139 For such a challenge, the vote will 
only be overturned if there is an election irregularity of the kind discussed in 
Part II.B.2.  Although the court did hear Dotson’s claim on the merits, it ulti-
mately did not find that his claim met this standard.140  In Dotson’s case, the 
court held that the ballot title was sufficient and fair, with no election irregu-
larity and no new election called for.141 
By retaining the same standard applied to other post-election challenges 
– that of “irregularities of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on the validity of 
the election” – most post-election ballot title challenges will likely go the way 
of Dotson and be upheld.  But the court’s opinion in Dotson is an open invita-
tion for a disgruntled voter to attempt to overturn any measure when it 
doesn’t go his or her way.  In the words of Judge Laura Denvir Stith, it also 
“invites sandbagging – waiting to see if a measure passes and only challeng-
ing the ballot title if the measure does pass, when it is too late to correct the 
ballot title.”142  It seems to create more problems than it might address, as 
will be discussed in Part IV. 
  
 
 137. Id. at 645 (emphasis added) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 115.555 (2000); State 
ex rel. Brown v. Shaw, 129 S.W.3d 372, 374 n.2 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (“After the 
six-week deadline of section 115.125.2, judicial relief is limited to an election con-
test.”). 
 138. Docket Summaries, SUP. CT. MO. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.courts.mo.gov/
SUP/index.nsf/fe8feff4659e0b7b8625699f0079eddf/2a7a6f05e839fc0d86257dab006f
4387?OpenDocument. 
 139. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 140. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 199 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 141. Id.  Judge Teitelman would have called for a new election.  Id. at 215–16 
(Teitelman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 142. Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
(Stith, J., dissenting). 
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C.  Substantive Challenges to Missouri Legislatively-Referred        
Constitutional Amendments 
Beyond procedural challenges to constitutional amendment elections 
and enactments, amendments can also be challenged based on content.143  
Such substantive challenges are typically brought post-election, as will be 
discussed below. 
1.  Pre-Election Substantive Challenges 
While Missouri provides strict procedural rules and challenges for con-
stitutional amendments before their enactment, there is little authority for the 
substantive, pre-enactment judicial review of a constitutional amendment’s 
content.144  In Missouri’s seminal case on election law, State ex rel. Hallibur-
ton v. Roach, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the secretary of state’s 
authority to review initiative petitions did not include reviews for unconstitu-
tionality.145  Chapter 116 challenges relate to the legal sufficiency of a pro-
posed constitutional amendment – and this legal sufficiency is used only in 
the sense of meeting legal procedural requirements.146  Similarly, judicial 
review under a Chapter 115 election contest evaluates “irregularity,” or prob-
lems in the process, not problems in the constitutionality of the substantive 
proposed provision.147  As the court stated in Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick: “[A]t 
no place in either the Missouri Constitution or in the implementing statutes is 
any court granted the power to enjoin an amendment from being placed on 
the ballot upon the ground that it would be unconstitutional if passed and 
adopted by the voters.”148 
 
 143. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 144. These might be brought as declaratory judgment petitions.  City of Kan. City 
v. Chastain, 420 S.W.3d 550 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).  Or perhaps writs of prohibition 
or mandamus.  State ex rel. City of El Dorado Springs v. Holman, 363 S.W.2d 552 
(Mo. 1962) (en banc). 
 145. State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 130 S.W. 689, 696 (Mo. 1910). 
 146. See id. (Graves, J., concurring) (describing the secretary of state’s job as 
“ministerial,” that is, without discretion, so that the secretary of state does not have 
the discretion to, for example, evaluate that substance of the provision); Theodore, 
supra note 54. 
 147. See MO. REV. STAT. § 115.583, .593 (2000); see also Brief of the State, supra 
note 122, at *15. 
 148. 615 S.W.2d 6, 11–12 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).  See also State v. Burns, 172 
S.W.2d 259, 265–66 (Mo. 1943) (holding that available challenges to a proposed 
amendment will not reach any substantive defects in the proposed amendment, but are 
preliminary and go only to the procedural errors in proposing it); Moore v. Brown, 
165 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Mo. 1942) (en banc). 
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Thus, it is entirely possible for states to vote on and pass “unconstitu-
tional” constitutional amendments.149  Under the doctrine of preemption, the 
state constitutional amendment must still comply with the federal constitu-
tion.150  But justiciability doctrines make prospective review of a state consti-
tutional amendment problematic.  Teresa Stanton Collett, a professor at the 
University of St. Thomas School of Law wrote: 
Evaluation of the constitutionality of an amendment based on the like-
ly consequences of its enactment . . . requires courts to consider all 
possible applications and weigh their relative merits.  Such a process 
requires a much broader base of evidence and is inherently specula-
tive; as a result, it is more likely to provoke claims of judicial activism 
or politicization.151 
Therefore, substantive challenges to the constitutional amendment be-
fore its adoption are not typically viable.  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
said it this way: “Courts do not sit in judgment on the wisdom or folly of 
proposals.  Neither will courts give advisory opinions as to whether a particu-
lar proposal would, if adopted, violate some superseding fundamental law, 
such as the U.S. Constitution.”152 
But Article I, Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution only permits citi-
zens to amend the constitution on the condition that “such change be not re-
pugnant to the Constitution of the United States,”153 and Missouri has al-
lowed an exception to the general rule against pre-election substantive chal-
lenges.154  In Knight v. Carnahan, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Western District addressed “the propriety of the trial court’s pre-election dis-
missal of substantive constitutional claims as an issue capable of repetition 
yet avoiding review.”155  It held that Missouri courts may review allegations 
that a proposed constitutional amendment is “facially unconstitutional.”156  
 
 149. Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age 
of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 327–31 
(2010). 
 150. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution mandates that it “shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. VI. 
 151. Collett, supra note 149, at 342. 
 152. Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 
1990) (en banc).  See also Cures Without Cloning v. Pund, 259 S.W.3d 76 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2008) (regarding free speech and equal protection challenges to a ballot’s sum-
mary statement, brought under both state and federal constitutions, where the court 
held that constitutional claims were not ripe for consideration), holding modified by 
Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 153. MO. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 154. Knight v. Carnahan, 282 S.W.3d 9, 21–22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 155. Id. at 21. 
 156. Union Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). 
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This means, “[T]he constitutional violation in a proposed measure is so obvi-
ous as to constitute a matter of form.”157  But this is a very high standard to 
meet.  Precedent suggests that if the asserted unconstitutionality is facially 
apparent, it will not be “debatable.”158  Missouri courts, while holding that 
this is a possible claim, have never upheld such a claim. 
2.  Post-election Substantive Challenges 
Post-election substantive challenges,159 on the other hand, have occa-
sionally met with success.160  For example, in 1999, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit struck one Missouri constitutional amendment in 
its entirety,161 holding that it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment, the Speech and Debate Clause, the Qualifications Clause, and 
Article V of the U.S. Constitution.162  Still, post-election substantive chal-
lengers also carry a heavy burden.  If “the people have demonstrated their 
will” by adopting the amendment, courts will “seek to uphold it if possi-
ble.”163 
In reviewing a constitutional challenge to a constitutional amendment, 
courts will uphold the amendment “over a provision of the constitution or 
earlier amendment inconsistent therewith, since an amendment to the consti-
tution becomes a part of the fundamental law, and its operation and effect 
cannot be limited or controlled by previous constitutions or laws that may be 
in conflict with it.”164  The courts will seek to “give effect, if at all possible, 
to the will of the people in passing the amendments.”165 
 
 157. Carnahan, 282 S.W.3d at 21 (citing State ex rel. Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon 
Comm. v. Klos, 35 S.W.3d 457, 468–69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 158. Carnahan, 282 S.W.3d at 22. 
 159. These might be brought as § 1983 claims or declaratory judgment claims.  
Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999) (prospective congressional candidate 
brought § 1983 action against Missouri Secretary of State, challenging constitutionali-
ty of initiative amending Missouri Constitution), aff’d, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). 
 160. See, e.g., Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d 
100 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 17 (Mo. 1981) (en 
banc); (Rendlen, J., dissenting); Household Finance Corp. v. Shaffner, 203 S.W.2d 
734 (Mo. 1947) (en banc). 
 161. Gralike, 191 F.3d at 911 (holding that the Court of Appeals would not sever 
the unconstitutional portions but strike the amendment in its entirety, as severance 
would require micromanagement entangling the Court of Appeals in state law issues). 
 162. See id.; see also Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir.1999). 
 163. Buchanan, 615 S.W.2d at 12. 
 164. State ex rel. Bd. of Fund Comm’rs v. Holman, 296 S.W.2d 482, 491 (Mo. 
1956) (en banc). 
 165. Barnes v. Bailey, 706 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
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D.  Challenges to the Right-to-Farm Amendment 
This broad framework for election contests and other challenges to leg-
islatively-referred constitutional amendments was applicable to the right-to-
farm amendment before and after its enactment.  As a legislatively-referred 
constitutional amendment, it was not susceptible to the challenges for initia-
tive petitions.166  But the only pre-election challenge available to the amend-
ment, the ballot title challenge under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
115.190, was not brought either.  Instead, because of the narrow margin of 
defeat in the election, Wes Shoemyer sought a recount under Section 
115.601.167  When the recount confirmed the amendment’s enactment, Shoe-
myer, along with others, filed a post-election challenge seeking a new elec-
tion.168  In the wake of Dotson, decided only a few months earlier, Shoemyer 
alleged that the Supreme Court of Missouri had jurisdiction to hear a post-
election challenge to a constitutional amendment’s ballot title.169  This raised 
the novel issue before the Supreme Court of Missouri whether this kind of 
review, without any pre-election action as in Dotson, was permissible.170 
The ballot title for the right-to-farm amendment read: “Shall the Mis-
souri Constitution be amended to ensure that the right of Missouri citizens to 
engage in agricultural production and ranching practices shall not be in-
fringed?”171  Shoemyer argued that the summary statement of the amend-
ment’s ballot title was “unfair, insufficient, deceptive, and misleading” be-
cause it “omitted a significant limitation of the right to farm (legislation by 
local government) and incorrectly stated the class of persons who benefitted 
from the newly-created right.”172  This, Shoemyer alleged, “caused irregulari-
ties in the results”173 of the election.174 
Specifically, Shoemyer argued that the ballot title did not inform voters 
of the limitation on the right to farm contained in the amendment’s lan-
guage:175 the right to farm would be “subject to . . . the powers, if any, con-
ferred by article VI.”176  Shoemyer asserted that this omission misled voters 
 
 166. See supra Part II.A. 
 167. Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, supra note 44, at *6. 
 168. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52, 
at *9. 
 169. Id. at *7. 
 170. See Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc) (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 171. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52, 
at *8. 
 172. Id. at *13. 
 173. Curiously, this is the standard for demanding a recount, and not a new elec-
tion.  See supra notes 107 and 126 and accompanying text. 
 174. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52, 
at *13. 
 175. Id. at *17. 
 176. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
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“to believe that the right to farm would be protected from any infringement 
whatsoever . . . .”177 
Additionally, he argued that the ballot title deceived voters by stating 
that the right-to-farm amendment would grant rights to Missouri citizens 
“when it actually provides rights only to ‘farmers and ranchers.’”178  He cited 
political opponents of the amendment who suggested “the terms ‘farmers and 
ranchers’ are broad enough to include any entity that is engaging in farming 
or ranching in the state of Missouri regardless of their state or country of res-
idency.”179 
However, Shoemyer did not present evidence of any voter irregularities 
beyond the language of the ballot title and arguments about why it would fail 
under the pre-election standards.180  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that 
the ballot title language was sufficient and fair and that there were no election 
irregularities, and held the results of the election and the validity of the provi-
sion.181 
Having failed on procedural election challenges, the only other alterna-
tives remaining for Dotson, or others opposing the amendment, would be 
substantive ones.  Dotson’s petition for a new election included a constitu-
tional challenge to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.593,182 which 
might have an impact on the pending challenge to the right-to-farm amend-
ment under that statute.  In Shoemyer’s right-to-farm challenge, the State 
seemed to suggest that Section 115.555 is unconstitutional, which would only 
have the effect of upholding the election and nullifying the election con-
test.183 
Aside from constitutional challenges to the election statutes, substantive 
challenges may be brought against the amendment’s content.184  An affected 
citizen might challenge the right-to-farm amendment as violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if, for example, farmers 
receive some privilege under this amendment that other classifications of 
people do not.  However, under federal constitutional jurisprudence, this 
would receive rational-basis scrutiny and would likely fail.185  Additionally, 
an affected citizen might challenge the right-to-farm amendment as violative 
 
 177. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52, 
at *17. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *18. 
 180. See Brief of the State, supra note 122, at *18 (“The only supposed ‘evidence’ 
of irregularities submitted by the Plaintiffs was the bare summary statement of the 
ballot title.”). 
 181. Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 175 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 182. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52, 
at *26. 
 183. Id. at *28 (“Contestees essentially argue that § 115.555 is unconstitutional as 
it applies to elections on Constitutional Amendments.”). 
 184. City of Kan. City v. Chastain, 420 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 185. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 642 n.1 (1996). 
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of the Takings Clause if, for example, it allowed a farmer’s property to create 
a constructive takings through nuisance.186  This might be successful as ap-
plied to a certain situation, but would likely not result in the amendment’s 
being stricken wholesale, given its broad language. 
It seems that the right-to-farm amendment, having been upheld on all 
procedural challenges, is here to stay.  It would likely not fail the kind of fa-
cial substantive challenge that would remove it from the constitution.  And 
the Supreme Court of Missouri has affirmed on numerous occasions the au-
thority of a state to “adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more 
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”187  The question 
then becomes how Missouri courts review challenges not to the amendment, 
but arising from it. 
III.  HOW MISSOURI COURTS REVIEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS 
The overarching rule of interpretation for a Missouri constitutional pro-
vision is that, while “every word employed in the constitution is to be ex-
pounded in its plain, obvious, and common-sense meaning,”188 it “should 
never be construed to work confusion and mischief unless no other reasona-
ble construction is possible.”189 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has established that its method of con-
stitutional construction is essentially one of broad statutory construction.  
Constitutional provisions “are subject to the same rules of construction as 
other laws, except that constitutional provisions are given a broader construc-
tion due to their more permanent character.”190  Just as statutory interpreta-
tion looks to legislative intent, the court’s analysis of constitutional amend-
ments has emphasized the intent of the drafters: “[A] court must undertake to 
ascribe to the words of a constitutional provision the meaning that the people 
understood them to have when the provision was adopted.”191 
There have been some recent debates, however, as to what this “broad 
statutory construction,” coupled with deference to drafter-intent, looks like in 
 
 186. See, e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors in & for Kossuth Cty., 584 N.W.2d 
309 (Iowa 1998) (holding that nuisance immunity provision in agricultural land 
preservation statute was unconstitutional). 
 187. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982); PruneYard Shopping 
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
 188. Akin v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 956 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo.1997) (en banc) 
(quoting State ex inf. Dalton v. Dearing, 263 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Mo. 1954) (en banc)). 
 189. Theodoro v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 527 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1975) (en 
banc) (citing State ex rel. Moore v. Tobermanm, 250 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1952) (en 
banc)). 
 190. Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), over-
ruled on other grounds by King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist., 361 S.W.3d 
414 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 191. Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
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practice.  Missouri’s first Constitution was drafted in 1820 and underwent a 
series of revisions in its first hundred years of existence.192  The current Mis-
souri Constitution is the result of a 1943–1944 constitutional convention and 
was formally adopted in 1945.193  In American Federation of Teachers v. 
Ledbetter, the Supreme Court of Missouri construed a 1945 constitutional 
amendment protecting the right of teachers to meet and bargain collective-
ly.194  The court examined debates of the 1943–1944 constitutional conven-
tion, the “American history” of the particular term at issue, and the statutory 
interpretations of the term at the time it was adopted.195  It reached the result 
that this constitutional right included a corresponding duty on the part of the 
school board to meet with teachers.196 
For the purposes of interpreting state constitutional amendments submit-
ted to popular vote after 1945,197 Missouri seems to have adopted a similar 
constitutional analysis: “[T]he primary rule is to ‘give effect to the intent of 
the voters who adopted the Amendment’ by considering the plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the word.”198  The plain and ordinary meaning is “that mean-
ing which the people commonly understood the words to have when the pro-
vision was adopted.”199  To determine this, the court will look to the meaning 
found in the dictionary.200 
The court has reasoned that it cannot determine voters’ intent “if a word 
has more than one dictionary definition that applies in the context of the pro-
vision.”201  If there is “duplicity, indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of 
an expression,” the constitutional amendment is ambiguous.202  To resolve 
 
 192. See William F. Swindler, Missouri Constitutions: History, Theory and Prac-
tice, 23 MO. L. REV. 32 (1958). 
 193. William F. Swindler, Missouri Constitutions: History, Theory and Practice 
(continued), FACULTY PUBLICATIONS, Paper 1617, 157 (1958), 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2632&context=facpubs. 
 194. 387 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 195. Id. at 364–64. 
 196. Id. at 367.  However, the dissent to this opinion emphasized the amend-
ment’s plain language and referred to previous interpretations of the constitutional 
provision as reaching an opposite result.  Id. at 370 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  The dis-
sent argued that the principal opinion raised serious separation of power concerns, 
that it could not rely on changes to the term at issue that were enacted by statutes, and 
that it could not change terms “by judicial mandate based on a judicial philosophy 
that changes the meaning of a state constitutional provision over time.”  Id. 
 197. This is when Missouri last held its constitutional convention.  Swindler, 
supra note 192. 
 198. Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 25 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Keller v. 
Marion Cty. Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)). 
 199. Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 200. StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar, 208 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. 2006) (en 
banc). 
 201. Johnson, 366 S.W.3d at 25. 
 202. J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 54 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo. 2001) (en 
banc) (quoting Lehr v. Collier, 909 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)). 
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any ambiguity in a constitutional provision, the court will apply rules of statu-
tory interpretation.203  Ultimately, then, the interpretation of both the original 
constitutional text and post-1945 amendments are methodically the same, but 
one looks to the “drafters’” intent, while the other looks to the “voters’” in-
tent.   Both rely on plain and ordinary meaning, using dictionary definitions 
to determine intended meaning and, in cases of ambiguity, default to the can-
ons of statutory construction.204 
Finally, all state constitutional provisions are “‘preempted and have no 
effect’ to the extent they conflict with federal laws.”205  They must therefore 
be interpreted to comply with, for example, the Equal Protection Clause, and 
all other provisions of the U.S. Constitution, and with all provisions of, for 
example, federal environmental regulations. 
A.  Probable Interpretations of the Right-to-Farm Amendment 
By understanding Missouri’s broad constitutional interpretory frame-
work, one can make some reasonable conjectures about how Missouri courts 
might interpret the recently adopted right-to-farm amendment. 
1.  “Agriculture” 
As a preliminary matter, it must be determined what exactly the voters 
intended to protect when they enacted this language – or rather, what the 
courts will likely determine the voters intended to protect by this language. 
The plain and ordinary meaning of “agriculture” is: “The science or art 
of cultivating soil, harvesting crops, and raising livestock.”206  Typically, 
“agriculture” is understood as encompassing more than “farming.”207  As 
stated in Black’s Law Dictionary: “[W]hile [agriculture] includes the prepara-
tion of soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and all 
their incidents, it also includes gardening, horticulture,208 viticulture,209  dair-
ying, poultry, bee raising, and ranching.”210 
 
 203. Johnson, 366 S.W.3d at 26. 
 204. Howard v. City of Kan. City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 787 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) 
(quoting Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc)). 
 205. Johnson, 366 S.W.3d at 26–27 (quoting State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, 320 
S.W.3d 145, 148 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)). 
 206. Agriculture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (10th ed. 2014). 
 207. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agriculture § 1. 
 208. Horticulture, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (“The cultivation of a 
garden; the art or science of cultivating or managing gardens, including the growing 
of flowers, fruits, and vegetables.”). 
 209. Viticulture, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (“The cultivation of the 
vine; vine-growing” – i.e., to produce grapes and wine). 
 210. Agriculture, supra note 206; see also St. Louis Rose Co. v. Unemployment 
Comp. Comm’n, 159 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1941) (construing horticulture as agriculture). 
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Indeed, the Missouri legislature’s definition of “agricultural products” 
has become increasingly inclusive.  Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
265.010, enacted in 1939 and last amended in 1949, deals with the regulation 
and marketing of agricultural products.211  These are defined to “include hor-
ticultural, viticultural, dairy, bee, and any farm product.”212  In 1982, the leg-
islature enacted Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.295, the right-to-farm 
statute discussed above.213  As used in that section, the term agricultural op-
eration included “any facility used in the production or processing for com-
mercial purposes of crops, livestock, swine, poultry, livestock products, 
swine products, or poultry products.”214  In 2013, the legislature enacted the 
most inclusive language yet, defining an “agricultural product” for purposes 
of urban agricultural zones in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 262.900 as: 
[A]n agricultural, horticultural, viticultural, or vegetable product, 
growing of grapes that will be processed into wine, bees, honey, fish 
or other aquacultural product, planting seed, livestock, a livestock 
product, a forestry product, poultry or a poultry product, either in its 
natural or processed state, that has been produced, processed, or oth-
erwise had value added to it in this state.215 
Similarly, Title XVII of the Missouri Revised Statutes, “Agriculture and 
Animals,” has come to include chapters on agritourism, apiaries, pesticides, 
seeds, stockyards, grain, poultry, livestock, and treated timber products.216  
Livestock includes not only cattle, swine, sheep, equine, goats, and poultry, 
but also “ostrich and emu, aquatic products . . . llamas, alpaca, buffalo, elk . . 
.217 and exotic animals.”218 
The terms of the constitutional amendment, however, are narrower than 
general “agriculture” and protect only “[t]hat agriculture which provides 
food, energy, health benefits, and security.”219  For example, although green-
houses for the production and sale of roses and other flowers have been held 
to be agricultural in Missouri courts,220 they probably would not be protected 
under this amendment. 
 
 211. MO. REV. STAT. § 265.010 (2000). 
 212. Id. 
 213. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000). 
 214. Id. 
 215. MO. ANN. STAT. § 262.900 (West 2016). 
 216. MO. STAT. tit. XVII, chs. 262, 264, 266, 276, 277, 280, and 281. 
 217. Elk are livestock insofar as they are “documented as obtained from a legal 
source and not from the wild and raised in confinement for human consumption or 
animal husbandry.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 277.020 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 218. Id. 
 219. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
 220. St. Louis Rose Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n, 159 S.W.2d 249, 249, 
250–51 (Mo 1941). 
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Crops that are grown for food and livestock, including fisheries, would 
obviously be protected under this amendment.  This would include large-
scale, confined animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”)221 and also extend to 
those operations raising exotic animals or elk and buffalo for the purposes of 
human consumption.  This might also include someone’s backyard garden 
that produces food, though as will be discussed below, there may be some 
economic contribution threshold before such an operation would be protected 
by this statute. 
This probably does not include the procurement of food through hunting 
or gathering, as the statutory language and plain meaning of agriculture en-
tails preparation and not just collection.  That is, it would protect the raising 
of cattle and growing of crops, and not just the harvest of them.  Therefore, 
an operation that hunts wild elk and sells their meat would not be included in 
this framework, but an operation that raises domesticated elk and sells their 
meat would likely be.222 
2.  “Farmers and Ranchers” 
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “farmer” is somewhat circu-
lar, referring most plainly to one who engages in farming.223  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines it specifically as “a person whose business is farming.”224  
Missouri’s statutory definitions related to the term “farmer” operate, unsur-
prisingly, on the assumption that a farmer is one who runs a farm.225  Thus, 
“farm” is the term that requires more investigation here. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri reasoned that one who produced farm 
products was a farmer.226  Missouri Agricultural Statistics Services defines 
farms as places with $1000 or more in annual sales of agricultural prod-
ucts.227  However, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 288.034’s definition of 
 
 221. McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC, 375 S.W.3d 157, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Bd. 
of Dirs. of Richland Twp. v. Kenoma, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 222. MO. REV. STAT. § 277.020 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 223. Farmer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 723 (10th ed. 2014). 
 224. Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 150.030, 350.010 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 348.500, 
288.034 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 226. Kan. City v. Rosehill Gardens, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Mo. 1976) (en 
banc) (“We have concluded that defendant is a ‘farmer’ and a producer of ‘farm 
products’ in growing products classified both as horticultural and floracultural [sic] as 
well as bedding plants.  We see no logical reason why a definition of farm products 
should be limited to products that can be consumed by either human beings or ani-
mals.”), overruled by Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. 
1997) (en banc). 
 227. Mo. Econ. Research & Info. Ctr., supra note 21. 
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“agricultural labor” contemplates farms that are not operated for profit.228  
Ultimately, then, a farmer seems to be involved in introducing some sort of 
agricultural product to the market, whether or not the farm is operated for 
profit, and thus might include an individual’s backyard garden.229 
On the other end of the spectrum, large corporations would probably be 
included as “farmers.”  Missouri has a corporate farm statute that limits the 
ability of corporations to operate farms in some circumstances – but its ex-
ceptions are quite inclusive.230  It allows “family farm corporations” or corpo-
rations incorporated for the purpose of owning and farming agricultural land, 
to farm so long as at least one-half of the stockholders in the company are 
members of a family related to each other within the third degree (including 
spouses), the family members own at least one-half of the stock, and one of 
the family members resides on or actively operates the farm.231  It also allows 
“authorized farm corporations”: a corporation comprised of shareholders who 
are all “natural persons,” not further corporations or organizations, and which 
receives two thirds or more of its net income from farming.232  Indeed, re-
gardless of this statute, the broadness afforded to constitutional provisions 
might mean that this term includes any corporation that produces farm prod-
ucts. 
Similarly, “ranchers” are, plainly, those who engage in ranching, and 
thus the term “ranching” requires more inquiry.233  A ranch is typically un-
derstood as “a large farm or estate for breeding cattle, horses, or sheep.”234  
Missouri offers no real statutory guidance on who ranchers might be,235 or on 
what “ranching” entails. 
Opponents of the amendment expressed concern that the right to farm 
for “farmers and ranchers,” as opposed to “Missouri citizens,” would privi-
lege foreign corporations who own or operate farms or ranches in Mis-
souri.236  At present, a Missouri statute limits foreign ownership of agricultur-
 
 228. It defines agricultural labor as one of five different possibilities of working 
on “farms,” and only one possibility includes working “on a farm operated for profit.”  
MO. REV. STAT. § 288.034(12)(1)(a)(e) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 229. See Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, supra 
note 15.  Indeed, a number of traditional farmers are turning to second, off-farm jobs.  
Id. 
 230. MO. REV. STAT. § 350.015 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 231. MO. REV. STAT. § 350.010(5) (2000). 
 232. Id. § 350.010(6). 
 233. Ranch, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Though some statutes apply to “farm or ranch” alike.  MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
135.679, 348.015, 578.005 (Cum. Supp. 2013).  One Missouri case discussed a “wild 
game ranch.”  High Adventure Game Ranch, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d 
905, 905 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 236. See, e.g., Chris Kardish, Missouri’s ‘Right-to-Farm’ Vote Isn’t as Simple as 
it Sounds, GOVERNING (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/
transportation-infrastructure/gov-right-to-farm-missouri-ballot.html. 
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al land to one percent of the total agricultural acreage in the state.237  Under 
this statute, a foreign business is one in which a controlling interest is owned 
by people who are not citizens or residents of the United States.238  But while 
the statute only refers to ownership of land, it would prevent a foreign busi-
ness from repurposing existing land to use agriculturally once that one per-
cent limit is met.239  This would seem a clear legislative infringement on the 
right of farmers and ranchers in Missouri.  It is possible that a Missouri court 
might uphold the statute under the new right-to-farm amendment.  In looking 
at the intent of voters, the court may consider the ballot title language de-
scribing the right of “Missouri citizens” to farm and ranch.240  But this might 
not overcome the clear arguments the other way. 
3.  Duly Authorized Powers 
Perhaps the most intriguing language of the amendment is its limitation 
that provides the right to farm is “subject to duly authorized powers, if any, 
conferred by Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.”241  The right-to-
farm amendment is the only section in the Bill of Rights, and in the Missouri 
Constitution for that matter, that includes this limitation.  It will most proba-
bly be interpreted to mean that the right to farm is subject to local govern-
ment but not the legislature. 
Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri establishes local government: 
counties, cities, and other municipal organizations.242  Counties are classified 
as first-, second-, or third-class based on their property values.243  Counties, 
cities, and other municipal organizations may enact local ordinances, but this 
 
 237. MO. ANN. STAT. § 442.571 (West 2016).  But a recent bill effectively creates 
a loophole to the one percent limitation, only requiring real estate transactions to be 
submitted to the director of the department of agriculture “if there is no completed 
Internal Revenue Service Form W-9 signed by the purchaser.” S. 12, 98th Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (amending § 442.571).  In other words, foreign corpora-
tions can purchase agricultural land through American subsidiaries, circumventing 
regulation because state regulators’ approval is no longer necessary. 
 238. MO. REV. STAT. § 442.566(2), (5) (2000). 
 239. Id. § 442.591. 
 240. H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), 
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/commit/HJR0011C.PDF. 
 241. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35.  For a legal analysis of this phrase, which was of 
great value to the analysis here, see David Cosgrove, Legal Analysis of Missouri 
Right to Farm Constitutional Amendment 1 (HJ Res. Nos. 11 & 7), COSGROVE L. 
GROUP, LLC, 
http://cosgrovelawllc.com/legal-analysis-of-missouri-right-to-farm-constitutional-
amendment-1-hj-res-nos-11-7/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 242. MO. CONST. art. VI. 
 243. See MO. REV. STAT. § 48.010 (2000) (“‘[A]ssessed valuation’ shall mean the 
valuation of all real and personal property as determined and finally established by 
the state agency charged with the duty of equalizing assessments.”); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 48.020 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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power is limited by the legislature through the Dillon rule.244  This rule was 
first stated in 1868 by Iowa’s Supreme Court Chief Justice John Dillon,245 
and it essentially limits municipalities’ power to act absent existing statutory 
authority.246 
Current legislation restricts counties’ abilities to enact ordinances regu-
lating agricultural operations.  For example, under Missouri Revised Statutes 
Section 64.620, second- and third-class counties are authorized to impose 
building restrictions, excluding farm buildings or structures.247  Similar provi-
sions are found in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 64.890, which exempt 
building and land-use restrictions of alternative counties from applying to 
“the raising of crops, livestock, orchards or forestry.”248  Additionally, Mis-
souri Revised Statutes Section 49.650 gives first-class counties authority to 
adopt ordinances, including for nuisance abatement, but excluding agricultur-
al property.249  It also authorizes counties to enact ordinances for storm water 
control – but again excludes agricultural properties from this provision.250  
Finally, Section 49.650.5 forbids third-class counties from enacting any new 
ordinances relating to agricultural operations.251  Charter counties,252 on the 
other hand, are not so limited.  They may enact any ordinance that does not 
conflict with state law.253 
 
 244. See Cosgrove, supra note 241.  See also Christian Cty. v. Edward D. Jones & 
Co., 200 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Babb v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
414 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Damon v. City of Kan. City, No. WD 75363, 
2013 WL 6170565 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013); State v. Ostdiek, 315 S.W.3d 758 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2011); Borron v. Farrenkopf, 5 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 245. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
 246. Kenneth D. Dean, Comment, The Dillon Rule – a Limit on Local Govern-
ment Powers, 41 MO. L. REV. 546, 546–47 (1976). 
 247. MO. REV. STAT. § 64.020 (2000). 
 248. Id. § 64.890.  An “alternative county” is defined in statute:  
 
The county commission of any county of the first class not having a charter 
form of government, or of any county of the second, third or fourth class may, 
after approval by vote of the people of the county, create a county planning 
commission to prepare a county plan for all areas of the county outside the 
corporate limits of any city, town or village which has adopted a city plan in 
accordance with the laws of this state.   
 
Id. § 64.800.1. 
 249. MO. REV. STAT. § 49.650.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 250. Id. § 49.650.1(4). 
 251. Id. § 49.650.5. 
 252. The only charter counties are Jackson, Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. Louis 
counties.  Cosgrove, supra note 241. 
 253. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a); see also Barber v. Jackson Cty. Ethics Comm’n, 
935 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
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The legislature has given cities and towns more authority to regulate ag-
ricultural operations.254  It has authorized third- and fourth-class cities to en-
act any ordinance not in conflict with federal and state laws.255  It has prohib-
ited townships, however, from creating regulations “with respect to the erec-
tion, maintenance, repair, alteration or extension of farm buildings or farm 
structures.”256  Missouri courts have consistently enforced this provision, 
striking down township zoning ordinances related to CAFOs’ buildings and 
structures.257 
When it comes to health and safety regulations, however, counties are 
authorized to make “orders, ordinances, rules or regulations . . . as will tend 
to enhance the public health and prevent the entrance of infectious, conta-
gious, communicable or dangerous diseases into such county.”258  These local 
regulations are superseded by state health rules and regulations, but they are 
not limited with reference to agriculture.259  A farm challenged a county ordi-
nance created under this statute, and the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Western District upheld it as being “rationally related” to public health.260 
This merely reflects the current state of affairs.  The legislature can al-
ways amend these statutes, or it can enact new statutes granting local gov-
ernments more powers.  But if history is any indication, there have only been 
attempts to further limit counties’ abilities to enact health regulations.261  
There have been no recent attempts to relax these limitations or otherwise 
expand local governments’ powers. 
At the same time, the specific language of the amendment seems to im-
ply that it is only subject to regulation by local governments under Article VI: 
the right to farm is “subject to duly authorized powers, if any, conferred by 
article VI of the Constitution of Missouri,”262 with no additional limitations.  
Traditional statutory interpretation would render any other construal probably 
 
 254. Cosgrove, supra note 241. 
 255. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 77.590, 79.110 (2000). 
 256. Id. § 65.677 (emphasis added). 
 257. See Cosgrove, supra note 241 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Richland Twp. v. Ke-
noma, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. 
Lincoln Twp. of Putnam Cty., 946 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)). 
 258. MO. REV. STAT. § 192.300 (2000). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Borron v. Farrenkopf, 5 S.W.3d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); see also Milton 
Const. & Supply Co. v. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 352 S.W.2d 685, 692 (Mo. 1961) (en 
banc) (“A regulation designed to promote the health and welfare of the people does 
not infringe on constitutional guaranties of personal rights and due process ‘unless the 
regulation passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of arbitrary pow-
er.”). 
 261. See, e.g., S. 364, 94th Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007); H.C.S. 
S.C.S. S. 692 (Mo. 2012); H.C.S. S.C.S. S. 9, H.C.S. S. 342 (Mo. 2013); H.R. 1728 
(Mo. 2014); H.R. 2210 (Mo. 2014). 
 262. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35; see also Cosgrove, supra note 241. 
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against the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision.263  Therefore, it will 
probably not be subject to Article III of the Missouri Constitution – regula-
tion by the legislature.  Although the legislature would have the power to 
expand or restrict local governments’ abilities to regulate farmers’ and ranch-
ers’ right to farm, it seems it would have no ability to compel the enactment 
of an ordinance if a local government chose simply not to regulate farmers 
and ranchers in a certain way. 
B.  Implications of the Right-to-Farm Amendment’s Placement in the 
Bill of Rights 
The interpretation of the right-to-farm amendment might also be nu-
anced by its placement in the bill of rights section of the Missouri Constitu-
tion, Article I, as opposed to the other articles of that document.  The Su-
preme Court of Missouri has held that provisions in the state constitution’s 
bill of rights can grant citizens affirmative rights, imposing affirmative du-
ties.264  In Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, 
Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield (“Lodge 15”), the court overruled a previous 
case, Quinn v. Buchanan.265  It held that Quinn was based on the “erroneous 
inference” that “a Bill of Rights, in this case the Missouri ‘Declaration of 
Rights’ found in article I of its constitution, does not grant ‘new’ rights; it 
merely declares those rights that the people already possess, regardless of 
whether they are the subject of a governmental grant.”266 
Instead, Lodge 15 affirmed that a bill of rights can grant new rights and 
does not merely “declare” existing rights.267  These new rights can give rise 
to new, affirmative duties for the state or other parties.268  For example, in 
Ledbetter, the court concluded that a constitutional amendment protecting the 
 
 263. Cosgrove, supra note 241.  Indeed, Cosgrove notes that “if the right were 
‘subject to’ laws enacted (or regulations promulgated) pursuant to state and/or local 
power, this clause would not be needed.”  Id. 
 264. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of Ches-
terfield (Lodge 15), 386 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“Moreover, inclusion 
in Missouri’s ‘Declaration of Rights’ does not mean that a provision cannot grant an 
affirmative right.  The people of Missouri may place anything they wish within their 
constitution so long as it is not contrary to the federal constitution.”); see State ex rel. 
St. Louis Fire Fighters Ass’n Local No. 73 AFL–CIO v. Stemmler, 479 S.W.2d 456, 
458 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (“[W]hen the people of the State of Missouri write or 
amend their constitution, they may insert therein any provision they desire, subject 
only to the limitation that it must not violate restrictions which the people have im-
posed on themselves and on the states by provisions which they have written into the 
federal constitution.”). 
 265. 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957) (en banc), overruled by Lodge 15, 386 S.W.3d 
755. 
 266. Lodge 15, 386 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Quinn, 298 S.W.2d at 417). 
 267. Id. at 762. 
 268. Id. 
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right of teachers to meet and bargain collectively implied a corresponding 
duty on the part of the school board to meet with teachers.269 
Given the Court’s holdings in Lodge 15 and Ledbetter, some might be-
lieve that farmers and ranchers would be able to independently assert their 
new right to farm – wielding that right as a sword by imposing affirmative 
duties on other parties in addition to defensively raising it as a shield when 
other parties infringe that right.  But the amendment seems to simply “de-
clare” a right that the people already possess.  Thus, the only new “right” 
might be protection from the legislature.  This is made clear when examining 
the right to farm against other traditionally recognized rights: the right to 
work and the right to use property. 
1.  The Right to Farm and the Right to Work 
Although it does not have a textual basis in either the U.S. or the Mis-
souri constitutions, the right to work at a lawful occupation is an essential 
component of liberty.270  Farmers already share in this right.271  Some states’ 
constitutional jurisprudences have specifically explored and guaranteed this 
right,272 and the Supreme Court of the United States has reasoned that “the 
 
 269. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 270. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See, e.g., Kafka v. Hagener, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (D. Mont. 2001) 
(quoting Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (Mont. 1996)) (“The inalienable 
right to pursue life’s basic necessities is stated in the Montana Declaration of Rights 
and is therefore a fundamental right; while not specifically enumerated in the terms of 
Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, neces-
sary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.”); Mont. Cannabis Indus. 
Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161 (Mont. 2012) (“While the right to the opportunity to 
pursue employment is not specifically enumerated in the Montana Constitution, it is a 
fundamental right, because it is a right without which other constitutionally guaran-
teed rights would have little meaning.”); Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174 (“[T]he right 
to the opportunity to pursue employment is itself a fundamental right and is encom-
passed within the right to pursue life’s basic necessities as declared under Article II, 
section 3 of Montana’s constitution.  Because the opportunity to work and to make a 
living is a fundamental right, it is incumbent upon the state to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest before it may constitutionally infringe upon that right.  Necessarily, 
demonstrating a compelling interest entails something more than simply saying it is 
so.”).  See, e.g., McCool v. City of Phila., 494 F. Supp. 2d 307, 328 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(citing Hunter v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 419 A.2d 631, 635 (Pa. 1980)) (“The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution as guaranteeing an individual’s right to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life.”). See, e.g., D’Amico v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 520 P.2d 10, 18 (Cal. 
1974) (in bank) (quoting Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971)) (the 
right to pursue a lawful occupation is fundamental if the employment sought is a 
“common occupations of the community”). 
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right to work for a living in the common occupations273 of the community is 
of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the 
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”274  Indeed, “[T]he right 
of an individual to engage in a lawful occupation . . . is embraced within the 
constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happi-
ness.”275  
At the same time, however, several courts have noted that this right is 
not “fundamental,”276 nor does it guarantee the right to a particular occupa-
tion277 (except in the limited context of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause,278 when a state restricts the employment opportunities of residents of 
other states).279  This general right to pursue a livelihood is subject to regula-
tion, and it may be limited by reasonable measures promoting the general 
welfare under the federal constitution.280  Any such occupational regulation is 
reviewed under the rational basis standard.281 
 
 273. Even if farming and ranching are considered some of these “common occu-
pations,” however, the right to pursue farming or ranching, specifically, is not funda-
mental or guaranteed.  See infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 274. Truax, 239 U.S. at 41. 
 275. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 832 (footnotes omitted). 
 276. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 380 (1979) 
(“[T]his Court has never held that the right to any particular private employment is a 
‘right of national citizenship,’ or derives from any other right created by the Constitu-
tion.”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (“[T]he Court finds 
that the right to work is not a fundamental right.”). 
 277. See Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1989) (for purposes 
of the Equal Protection Clause, the right to pursue a calling or profession is not a 
fundamental right); Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 250 (D. Minn. 1972), 
aff’d, 410 U.S. 976 (1973) (employment not a fundamental right protected by Four-
teenth Amendment’s equal protection); Townsend v. Cty. of L.A., 49 Cal. App. 3d 
263, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (there is no fundamental right to work for a particular 
employer, public or private). 
 278. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 279. The Supreme Court has characterized the ability to pursue a particular line of 
employment as a fundamental right in the limited context of the privileges and im-
munities clause, where a state government has attempted to limit employment oppor-
tunities to state or municipal residents.  Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage 
Laws Enf’t Comm’n, 889 F.2d 929, 932 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Supreme Court of 
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279–80 (1985)) (limiting bar admission to state resi-
dents)). 
 280. See, e.g., Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 
238–39 (1957) (citations omitted) (“A State cannot exclude a person from the practice 
of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the 
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  A State can 
require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in 
its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a 
rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law.”). 
 281. Id. at 239. 
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It might seem that Missouri’s new right-to-farm amendment expands 
this general “declarative” right to pursue an occupation to include the particu-
lar occupations of farming or ranching.  The language of the amendment 
protects “the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching 
practices,”282 and any citizen engaging in farming or ranching practices is, at 
least based on Missouri’s judicial history,283 a farmer or rancher.  This may 
not extend, however, to those who are not already farmers or ranchers or who 
do not have the means to become so.  By this language, a citizen does not 
have the right to “become” a farmer or rancher, or to begin to engage in farm-
ing or ranching practices.  Instead, those who otherwise exercise their general 
right to pursue a livelihood and lawfully become farmers or ranchers are then 
protected with a more particular right to continue to pursue that livelihood. 
But practically, it does not seem that this would play out.  A terminated 
farm employee could not compel his employer to keep him on because of his 
“right-to-farm.”  Nor could a farmer compel her off-the-farm employer to 
grant her an extended leave of absence during harvest season because of her 
right to bring in crops.  Therefore, in terms of farming as an occupation, the 
amendment does not seem to grant a “new” right to Missouri citizens who are 
or who become ranchers and farmers and does not seem to raise new, corre-
sponding duties.  Instead, it would protect farmers from adverse legislation 
that would interfere with their right to pursue the occupation of farming, 
shielding farmers from such legislation. 
2.  The Right to Farm and the Right to Use Property 
Put another way, the right to farmland seems simply to be a declarative 
right in terms of using one’s own property in the manner one would like.  A 
property owner has the fundamental right to use and enjoy his or her private 
property.284  The traditional view is that “[e]very proprietor of land, where 
not restrained by covenant or custom, has the entire dominion of the soil and 
the space above and below to any extent he may choose to occupy it, and in 
this occupation he may use his land according to his own judgment . . . .”285 
John Locke considered the protection of private property one of the 
most important purposes of government – indeed, the primary reason that 
independent beings could feel compelled to subject themselves to the “do-
minion and control” of government power.286  Thus, property rights have long 
 
 282. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (emphasis added). 
 283. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the definition of “farmer” and “rancher” in 
Missouri statutory and judicial history). 
 284. 2 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 582.5 (3d ed.). 
 285. Id. 
 286. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 184, §123 (Thomas I. Cook 
ed., Hafner Publishing Co. 1947); see also 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 629 
(“[T]he protection of [the right of property] is one of the most important objects of 
government.  It is said that the right of property lies at the foundation of our constitu-
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been guaranteed at common law, though they are also protected by state and 
federal constitutions.287  In the constitutional sense, a “property right” refers 
to “the right to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of property.”288  The govern-
ment cannot take property without adequate justification289 or without just 
compensation in the case of eminent domain.290  These constitutional protec-
tions “should be liberally construed in favor of the right of property.”291  
Thus, property owners have long enjoyed the right to use their property as 
they saw fit – including using their property to farm or ranch.  Still, this right 
has also traditionally been subject to certain usage requirements.  For exam-
ple, even at common law, one could enjoy his or her own property only inso-
far as it was not a nuisance to another’s property.292  More recently, and espe-
cially in the context of state and local government, zoning laws significantly 
restrict how property owners may use their property.293 
In Missouri, for example, zoning is a local legislative act.294  It is a 
county’s or municipality’s legislative body, not the state’s, that has the power 
to zone property.295  They have broad discretion, so long as their zoning 
“bears a substantial relation to the public welfare.”296  As the Missouri Court 
of Appeals for the Eastern District explained, “[i]f the public welfare is not 
served by the zoning or if the public interest served by the zoning is greatly 
outweighed by the detriment to private interests, the zoning is considered to 
be arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, violative of [constitutional] due 
process . . . .”297 
Most constitutional zoning challenges in Missouri, up to this point, have 
been brought as constitutional due process challenges.298  However, a chal-
lenge under the right-to-farm amendment would not be the first time a Mis-
souri-specific constitutional provision was additionally used to challenge a 
zoning ordinance.  In 1875, the Missouri Constitution was amended to forbid 
not only the “taking” of private property without just compensation, but also 
 
tional government and is necessary to the existence of civil liberty and free institu-
tions, and that such right is essential in our conception of freedom.”). 
 287. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 742. 
 288. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 629. 
 289. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV (Substantive Due Process Clauses). 
 290. Id. at amend. V. 
 291. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 845. 
 292. See, e.g., 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 47. 
 293. See Stephen L. Kling et al., Zoning As A Tool of Land Use Control an Analy-
sis of the Use of Zoning As A Land Use Control, 64 J. MO. B. 230 (2008). 
 294. Hoffman v. City of Town & Country, 831 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); 
see generally State ex rel. Helujon, Ltd. v. Jefferson Cty., 964 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 295. Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (citing MO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 89.020–.060 (1969)); see also MO. REV. STAT. ch. 64. 
 296. Loomstein v. St. Louis Cty., 609 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 297. Id. 
 298. See, e.g., Hoffman, 831 S.W.2d 223; Allen, 488 S.W.2d at 673. 
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“damage to private property without fair compensation.”299  In the 1927 case 
of State v. Christopher, plaintiffs argued that even if zoning did not qualify as 
an unconstitutional taking under the federal constitution, it did qualify as 
damage under Missouri’s constitutional provision.300  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri rejected this interpretation.301  It was “unimpressed by the change in 
the wording in the 1875 Constitution, dismissing it as an attempt to remedy 
an error of construction contained in earlier decisions which had ascribed an 
unduly narrow definition to the phrase ‘taking of private property.’”302  The 
court conducted traditional due process analysis, and it held that the zoning 
ordinance was a “valid exercise” of the state’s police power as it was a “rea-
sonably appropriate means” of accomplishing specific public objectives.303 
The test is similar today and probably would not change for the right-to-
farm amendment.  As a recent article in the Missouri Bar Journal explained, 
“[i]n measuring the reasonableness of a zoning regulation, Missouri courts 
weigh the benefit to the general public against any private detriment by con-
sidering several factors,” including “(i) adaptability of the property to its zon-
ing, (ii) significant reduction in value of the property based upon the zoning, 
(iii) incompatibility of the zoning with surrounding uses, and (iv) conformity 
of the zoning to the local government’s comprehensive plan.”304 
Missouri courts presume that zoning ordinances are valid, meaning that 
the challenger must prove that the zoning ordinance is unreasonable.305  In 
evaluating the ordinance, courts employ a “fairly debatable” standard of re-
view: “[I]f the reasonableness or constitutionality of a zoning regulation is 
fairly debatable, the zoning regulation will stand.”306 
Given the amendment’s express limitation to Article VI powers, the 
right-to-farm amendment would probably have no effect on these provisions.  
Again, the amendment merely protects an existing property right from future, 
state legislative infringement. 
 
 299. 18 MO. PRAC., REAL ESTATE LAW--TRANSACT. & DISPUTES § 24:3 (3d ed. 
2015). 
 300. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 298 S.W. 720, 725 (Mo. 
1927) (en banc). 
 301. Id. 
 302. 18 MO. PRAC., supra note 299, at § 24:3.  “In view of the foregoing it is clear 
that the addition of the word ‘damaged’ to that of ‘taken’ in the eminent domain 
clause of our Constitution did not broaden its limitation.  The amendment operated to 
correct an error of construction and nothing more.”  Christopher, 298 S.W.at 723. 
 303. Christopher, 298 S.W. at 724. 
 304. Kling et al., supra note 293, at 235. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
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C.  How the Amendment Might Affect Missouri Law 
The principles of preemption that apply at the federal constitutional lev-
el are also applicable at the state level in Missouri.307  Therefore, a constitu-
tional amendment can preempt state and local laws.308  In Missouri, a statute 
is assumed to be constitutional and will only be held unconstitutional when a 
plaintiff proves that it “clearly and undoubtedly contravene[s] the constitu-
tion.”309  A court will uphold a statute unless it “plainly and palpably affronts 
fundamental law embodied in the constitution,”310 and “[d]oubts will be re-
solved in favor of the constitutionality” of the statute.311 
The right-to-farm amendment may render some existing Missouri stat-
utes unconstitutional as applied to farmers.  For example, Missouri Revised 
Statutes Section 523.010 allows public utilities to condemn land for the pur-
poses of “the manufacture or transmission of electric current for light, heat or 
power . . . .”312  If a public utility company and a farmer could not agree on 
the proper compensation to be paid for the farmer’s land in such a case, this 
statute would allow the public utility company to condemn the farmer’s prop-
erty.313  This might very well be construed as “plainly and palpably” affront-
ing the farmer’s right to farm. 
Additionally, the statute that allegedly catalyzed the movement toward 
this amendment, Proposition B, might also be affected.314  It is difficult to 
know exactly how because the amendment does not include a standard of 
review.  For example, another bill of rights provision recently passed in Mis-
souri states that gun laws will be subject to strict scrutiny.315  The right-to-
 
 307. See id. 
 308. See id. 
 309. Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys v. Barton Cty., 311 S.W.3d 737, 740–41 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc).  See St. Louis Cty. v. Prestige Travel, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Mo. 
2011) (en banc). 
 310. Barton Cty., 311 S.W.3d at 741 (quoting United C.O.D. v. State, 150 S.W.3d 
311, 313 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)). 
 311. Id. (quoting Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys & Circuit Att’ys Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot 
Cty., 256 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo. 2008) (en banc)). 
 312. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.010 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (“[F]or the manufacture or 
transmission of electric current for light, heat or power, including the construction, 
when that is the case, of necessary dams and appurtenant canals, flumes, tunnels and 
tailraces and including the erection, when that is the case, of necessary electric steam 
powerhouses, hydroelectric powerhouses and electric substations or any oil, pipeline 
or gas corporation engaged in the business of transporting or carrying oil, liquid ferti-
lizer solutions, or gas by means of pipes or pipelines laid underneath the surface of 
the ground, or other corporation created under the laws of this state for public use . . . 
.”). 
 313. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2000) (giving landowners right to 
seek widening of other’s private road). 
 314. MO. REV. STAT. § 273.345 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (the “Canine cruelty preven-
tion act”). 
 315. MO. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
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farm amendment provides no such guidance.  On the one hand, the Missouri 
courts might defer to the legislature, as any doubts about whether farmers can 
still farm while treating their animals poorly would be resolved in favor of the 
constitutionality of the statute.  On the other hand, the courts might well say 
that what is currently animal abuse falls within the purview of “farming and 
ranching practices” and strike these and other provisions down as applied to 
farmers and ranchers.316 
However, where public health is involved, statutes may still be upheld 
even if they require farmers and ranchers to farm or ranch in a particular way.  
For example, farmers will probably be required to continue to dispose of dead 
animals in the same way and to quarantine sick animals.317  Similarly, where 
state inspection is required and certain standards must be met before putting 
farm products on the market for human consumption, the right to farm would 
probably not supersede.318  Where the public benefit is not so clear, however, 
such as Missouri Revised Statutes Section 266.430’s requirement that farmers 
cook garbage before feeding it to swine, farmers might win a challenge.319 
Additionally, the amendment will likely broaden the statutory protec-
tions already in place for nuisance.  Missouri has had a “right-to-farm” statute 
since 1982, which essentially designates farms as “permanent” nuisances, 
protected from public or private nuisance claims.320  It allows them reasona-
ble expansion without fear of new nuisance suits.321  For more dramatic ex-
pansion, this statute effectively creates a twelve-month statute of limitations 
from the time any new operation began that might change conditions for sur-
rounding properties.322  This essentially immunizes farmers from nuisance 
claims if none are filed within one year.323  Any agricultural operation that 
 
 316. See also MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (relating to vide-
otapes or digital recording of farm animal abuse or neglect). 
 317. MO. REV. STAT. § 267.590 (2000) (required quarantine of animal or herd by 
state veterinarian); MO. REV. STAT. § 577.076 (2000) (penalty for littering with car-
casses); MO. ANN. STAT. § 577.076 (West 2016) (effective Jan. 1, 2017) (penalty for 
the unlawful disposition of a dead animal). 
 318. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 196.935 (2000) (requiring the pasteurization of 
milk before selling to public, but allowing direct sales of raw, unpasteurized milk). 
 319. MO. REV. STAT. § 266.430 (2000) (requiring a permit for feeding livestock 
garbage). 
 320. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000) (enacted 1982, amended 1990); Fact 
Sheet, Right-to-Farm Laws, AM.  FARMLAND TRUST (Sept. 1998), http://www.farm
landinfo.org/sites/default/files/FS_RTF_9-98_1.pdf.  Missouri’s adoption of this 
statute was part of a wider national movement for agricultural protection.  Id.  Be-
tween 1963 and 1994, every state enacted some form of right-to-farm nuisance law, in 
hopes of protecting farmers from litigious neighbors and also to document the im-
portance of farming to the community.  Id. 
 321. § 537.295. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
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qualifies for protected status under this statute may assign this protected sta-
tus: it is alienable and inheritable.324 
Missouri’s right-to-farm statute is still subject to the farm’s compliance 
with “all county, state, and federal environmental codes, laws, or regula-
tions.”325  Furthermore, a farm’s reasonable expansion may not include any 
changes that create “a substantially adverse effect upon the environment,” “a 
hazard to public health and safety,” or “a measurably significant difference in 
environmental pressures upon existing and surrounding neighbors because of 
increased pollution.”326  A farmer is also still liable for any nuisance claim 
arising from negligent or improper agricultural operations and for any injuries 
arising from pollution, water contamination, or overflow from the agricultural 
operation.327 
Thus, although this statute protects farmers in Missouri, it has clear lim-
iting principles.  It is also narrowly addressed to nuisance claims.328  The 
right-to-farm amendment differs from the statute in that it, theoretically, pro-
vides much broader protections applicable to all sorts of claims and includes 
fewer limitations.  For example, forestry and urban operations are not current-
ly covered by the statute, but very well could be by the constitutional 
amendment.329  Additionally, the right-to-farm amendment may lift some of 
the restrictions of the statute – though this is only if the court does not rely on 
statutory tradition in its own construal of the provision. 
Many other statutes or regulations that might approach “plainly and pal-
pably” affronting the amendment’s general premise are specifically allowed 
to, based on the amendment’s final clause asserting that the right to farm is 
subject to duly authorized county powers.330  As discussed above, counties 
may exercise the general police power in enacting local laws and ordinanc-
es.331 
Other statutes would probably not be affected.  Missouri Revised Stat-
utes Section 441.280 allows a landlord to put a lien on his tenant farmer’s 
crops for rent.332  It seems very unlikely that this could be successfully chal-
lenged under the right-to-farm amendment.  The right to “engage in farming 
and ranching practices,” while it may encompass putting agricultural products 
on the market, would not supersede other contractual obligations, or suddenly 
entitle farmers and ranchers to top dollar or affirmative market advantages 
simply because of the nature of their product.333 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. See id. 
 329. See id. 
 330. See supra Part III.A.3.  See also MO. REV. STAT. § 243.240 (2000) (county 
commissions to maintain efficiency and have management and control). 
 331. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 332. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.280 (2000) (“Landlord’s lien on crops for rent”). 
 333. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 35. 
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Similarly, statutes allowing state public health boards to access farms 
and ranches would probably still be considered consistent with the right con-
ferred by the amendment.  For example, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
196.555 gives the state milk board access to all Missouri dairy farms.334  Such 
access probably does not clearly contravene the right to engage in farming 
practices.  And as far as environmental regulations are concerned, federal 
statutes would obviously preempt here, so farmers and ranchers will still need 
to comply with federal regulations. 
Some additional areas of interest moving forward might be in the disso-
lution of marital relationships or partnerships: How might a court divide 
marital or partnership property when one or more parties are farmers or 
ranchers?  Additionally, how might conflicts between two farmers be re-
solved?  For example, if one farmer wanted to grow organic produce and the 
neighboring farmer used pesticides that contaminated the other’s organic 
operation, whose right would prevail?  That is, the right-to-farm amendment 
guarantees the right to “farm,” but in what way?  These questions are difficult 
to answer at this point. 
IV.  NEEDED REFORM 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has explained that procedural require-
ments for constitutional amendments are intended to “(1) promote an in-
formed understanding by the people of the probable effects of the proposed 
amendment, or (2) prevent a self-serving faction from imposing its will upon 
the people without their full realization of the effects of the amendment.”335  
The available statutory challenges reflect similar goals.336  But these statutory 
challenges may need some revision to actually effect their purpose given the 
changing state of political affairs. 
For example, Section 116.190, which allows ballot title challenges, was 
enacted in 1980.337  In 2014 alone, appellate courts reviewed three times as 
many Section 116.190 cases as in the first decade following its enactment.338  
This is probably due in large part to an increase in the number of initiative 
petitions being submitted, with only sixteen in 2004, but 143 in 2012 – a sig-
 
 334. MO. REV. STAT. § 196.555 (2000). 
 335. Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 11–12 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). 
 336. See id. 
 337. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016). 
 338. They reviewed a single case between 1980 and 1990.  Union Elec. Co. v. 
Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).  And three cases in 2014.  Seay v. 
Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014); Sinquefield v. Jones, 435 S.W.3d 674 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014); State ex rel. Dienoff v. Galkowski, 426 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2014). 
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nificant increase in the number of ballots available to challenge.339  This is 
therefore a timely and developing issue. 
With lobbyists becoming more involved in the petition initiative process 
and correspondingly in the judicial contest process,340 Missouri may need 
legislative reform of its election laws – or perhaps amendments to constitu-
tional provisions governing amendment procedure.  Certainly, the answer is 
not to prohibit direct democracy, but rather, this Comment questions the ade-
quacy of the existing legal challenges to Missouri constitutional amendments 
when these amendments are enacted via a single election.  The enactment of 
the right-to-farm amendment showed how politically-charged cam-
paigns fueled by interest groups could directly affect Missouri’s Bill of 
Rights.  Existing legal challenges in Missouri may not be sufficient to protect 
the constitution from future, similarly political amendments that might 
be more harmful to Missourians and contribute to governmental dysfunc-
tion.341  Missouri is at present a relatively easy forum for enacting state con-
stitutional amendments, which might attract interest groups seeking a test site 
for national proposals,342 or foreign corporations seeking favorable venues to 
conduct business.  Missourians should be able to subject such amendments to 
strict procedural requirements, requiring judicial review if necessary to ensure 
compliance. 
Shoemyer’s and Dotson’s challenges to recent constitutional amend-
ments highlight current inadequacies in the constitutional amendment pro-
cess.  In particular, the statutory limitation of ten days to bring a ballot title 
challenge,343 but the (necessary) difficulty of bringing a post-election chal-
lenge, leaves ballot title challengers between a rock and a hard place.  Be-
cause voters rely so heavily on ballot titles and summaries on election day – 
with many voters not informed about the issues until they arrive at the ballot 
box – judicial review of ballot titles may be one of the most important checks 
on the political process.344 
Perhaps to address the issue of mootness, in 2013 the legislature amend-
ed Section 116.190, governing ballot title challenges to automatically extin-
guish any action brought under that section that is not fully and finally adju-
 
 339. Theodore, supra note 54, at 1421–22   “Of the 143 petitions filed in 2012, 
sixty-one came from one of three entities and addressed one of three topics, giving an 
appearance of ballot title shopping.”  Id. at 1422. 
 340. See SELDEN BIGGS & LELIA B. HELMS, THE PRACTICE OF AMERICAN POLICY 
MAKING 146 (2007). 
 341. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana, 71 
MONT. L. REV. 325, 326–27 (2010) (quoting the Chief Justice of California, who 
observed in 2009 that “in times of fiscal crisis ‘Frequent amendments--coupled with 
the implicit threat of more in the future--have rendered our state government dysfunc-
tional’”). 
 342. See John Slavin, The Future of Initiative and Referendum in Missouri, 48 
MO. L. REV. 991 (1983). 
 343. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016). 
 344. See Slavin, supra note 342; Theodore, supra note 54. 
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dicated, including appeals, within 180 days of its filing.345  It provides an 
exception for good cause, but only for court-related scheduling issues and not 
any of the parties’ good cause claims.346  This section only seems to com-
pound the difficulties of those who file a ballot title claim. 
Judicial review during the political process should be limited, and the 
answer to these issues does not seem to be allowing additional statutory chal-
lenges.  The answer is also not to open up post-election challenges more 
broadly, as the court did in Dotson.  This undermines voter confidence and 
creates the added expense of not only more post-election challenges, but also 
the expense of ordering new elections. 
But perennially moot challenges to ballot titles are not challenges at all.  
If the legislature has recognized the importance of this judicial challenge by 
codifying it in Section 116.190, they should also enable it to be legitimately 
adjudicated.  One way to do so might be to require that constitutional 
amendments roll over to the next year’s ballot or require that they be certified 
for a certain number of months before allowed onto the ballot. 
Other options for reform not related to judicial review might be to 
heighten the standards for constitutional amendment passages, though these 
options would first require constitutional amendments, not simple statutory 
amendments.347  The constitution might limit the governor’s authority to or-
der a special election, which reduces the amount of time available for review-
ing and challenging ballot titles.348  For legislatively-referred constitutional 
amendments, Missouri might require a majority vote from both legislative 
houses for two sessions in a row.349  Another way might be to require a su-
permajority popular vote, not a simple majority.350  Given the differences 
between a constitution and a statute, Missouri would do well to ensure that 
changes to its constitution are the result of an informed and reasoned democ-
racy and not a rushed and uninformed mobocracy.351 
CONCLUSION 
The right-to-farm amendment may just reaffirm rights already available 
to Missouri citizens.  Even if it was intended to be largely symbolic, however, 
the amendment may actually put a stop to future legislative regulation of 
farming and ranching in Missouri, may overturn some existing legislation, 
and may impose unforeseen affirmative duties on non-farming and ranching 
 
 345. 2013 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.R. 117 (West); § 116.190. 
 346. § 116.190. 
 347. See MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(b). 
 348. Id. 
 349. See id. at art. III, § 52. 
 350. See id. at art. XII, § 2(b). 
 351. See generally Aaron Zelinsky, Constitutional Amendment by Popular Vote: 
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Missourians.  It may well be the “wake-up call” for Missourians at large that 
Proposition B was for the Missouri Farmers Bureau.352 
A constitution is different from other sources of law in both authority 
and subject matter.  It is the highest source of law, as it is the creation of “the 
people” themselves, and it embodies that people’s fundamental values.353  In 
practice, while Missouri’s constitution is its highest source of law, its subject 
matter is becoming increasingly devoted to the mundane, not the essential 
and fundamental.  For example, Missouri’s state constitution concerns itself 
not just with Missourians’ freedoms of speech and religion, but also includes 
a provision legalizing “charitable bingo” and provisions for establishing wa-
ter pollution control.354 
Now Missourians have also enacted a pre-emptory “right to farm” by a 
bare majority vote.  At the end of the day, the amendment is probably more of 
an assertion or priority to farm rather than an absolute right.  Still, even if it 
only memorializes farmers’ right to farm as insurance against the possibility 
of unfavorable legislation in the future, that could play out to be a significant 
change.  The enactment of the right-to-farm amendment threw a rock into the 
lake of Missouri law, and no one knows for certain what its ripple effects will 
be. 
Direct democracy should be available to the people to enact such 
change, but more public deliberation is needed before the enactment of the 
provision.  Because substantive review of a constitutional amendment is nei-
ther feasible nor desirable before an election, procedural safeguards must be 
strictly followed to ensure that the Missouri Constitution is not unintentional-
ly altered.  At present, the legislature does not allow sufficient time for judi-
cial review of the political process, based on strict procedural challenges, as 
was made clear by Dotson.  Additional time for the ballot preparation and 
political process would allow for more reasoned and informed voters and a 
more legitimate constitutional amendment process. 
 
 
 352. Mannies, supra note 29. 
 353. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 761, 814 (1992) 
 354. MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 39(a), 37(b). 
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